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Executive Summary
The Study of the Socio-economic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan (SIMAA) forms
part of the World Bank/ UNDP Afghanistan Watching Brief Project. The study objective
is to analyse the problem of mines, the costs and benefits of mine operations and how to
deal with the mine problem from an integrated socio-economic perspective. The main
focus of the study is on tangible economic impacts of mine action, benefits and costs of
clearing units of land of different types and the choice of de-mining techniques.
Afghanistan is among the most mine-affected countries in the world. By the year 2000,
the area remaining contaminated by landmines was estimated at over 700 km2 , spread
throughout the entire country. Of this over 330 km2 are assessed to be vitally important
areas. National statistics on mine victims are seriously deficient. Different sources give
figures for the number of mine victims in Afghanistan varying from 150 to 500 casualties
a month.
The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) started operations in 1989. Hence
it is a mature program which has gained a great deal of experience during more than a
decade of implementation. MAPA is financed from two main sources, the main one being
UNOCHA, but funds are also passed from donors directly to individual NGOs. The
amount of funds passed on directly is still only partially known to MAPA. Substantial
resources have been devoted to the mine action program over the years, and the total
funding of MAPA in 1999 through the UNOCHA Afghanistan Emergency Trust Fund
was USD 22 million. Although data on direct funding of mine action NGOs are
incomplete, as much as USD 6 million is estimated to have been contributed to mine
action in this manner in 1999.
The study estimates benefit-cost ratios for clearance of mines from different types of land
using different de-mining techniques, through the use of case studies. The quantified
economic benefits from de-mining are related to reductions in the numbers of mine
accidents (affecting both people and livestock) and reclamation of mined land for
productive use. The cost side includes the costs of MAPA plus the economic loss
attributable to accidents suffered by de-miners. Benefits and costs are converted to net
present value using a discount rate of 10%.
The economic loss related to a fatal casualty from a mine accident in Afghanistan is
estimated at USD 12,000. The loss from a typical mine victim is estimated at USD 9,000.
One casualty every year over 15 years will then represent a total economic loss of 69,000
USD in net present value terms.
Three quarters of Afghanistan’s land area supports only sparse grazing in mountains and
deserts, while the 5% comprising irrigated valley floors produces 85% of all agricultural
output. Before the war about 85% of the people lived in rural villages. During the war
over one third of the population fled the country.
Afghanistan is an agricultural country, and traditionally around 70% of the labour force
has been engaged in agriculture related activities. The net value of production on cleared
agricultural land shows wide variations, ranging from USD 13,500 per km2 annually in
the Northern Region to USD 520,000 in the provinces of Kandahar, Zabul and Oruzgan.
The benefits from clearing irrigation areas are even more substantial, amounting to as
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much as USD 1.5 million per km2 annually in the provinces with the best conditions for
agriculture.
Over 80% of Afghanistan can be classified as pasture. The livestock sector’s contribution
to the gross domestic product has been estimated at USD 508 million in 1998-99. The net
output to the farmer per animal per year is found to vary from USD 9 for sheep and goats
to USD 31 for horses and USD 51 for cattle. Net annual output value from livestock
rearing on one km2 of grazing area varies regionally between USD 1,200 and USD 2,000.
Loss of animals to mine accidents is estimated at about USD 2,500 per km2 annually.
The road network in Afghanistan has deteriorated seriously as a result of war activities,
and large stretches were contaminated with mines. In certain periods this has contributed
to sharply higher food prices. The benefits from clearing mined roads are calculated as
cost and time savings for passengers now travelling with vehicles on the safe road link as
compared to the longer alternative route. The benefits from clearance of mined roads are
considerable, over USD 250,000 annually per 50 km.
Turning to the cost side, MAPA clearance costs of mined areas are estimated to USD
0.77 per m2 for the year 1999, while clearance of former battlefields costs USD 0.03 per
m2 . Agricultural land comes close to the average in area cleared per team hour, while
grazing areas are normally much less and residential are far more time consuming.
Dog teams, the most efficient technique overall, on average clear 3.5 times the amount of
mined land cleared by manual teams per team hour. This technique cannot be used on all
types of land, however. The area of minefields cleared per team hour of work under the
MAPA programme has decreased over time. One explanation for this could be the
increasing difficulty of tasks, as the easier-to-clear fields may have been taken care of
first. However, additional analysis of trends in costs over time may be useful.
Relatively large cost variations have been found to exist between some of the mine
clearance agencies. There is a need to look further into the strengths, limitations and cost
structures of the different clearance techniques and also the approach and operational
routines of the individual agencies engaged. More direct competition among clearance
agencies would be a means of increasing cost-efficiency in the mine action programme.
Economic returns from de-mining are estimated to be high in general, especially when it
is kept in mind that there are additional, non-quantifiable benefits from mine clearance,
for individuals, communities, and societies. The greatest returns are found in the case of
clearance of irrigation systems in provinces with good conditions for agriculture, where
use of all techniques can be convincingly defended. Returns are also high for agricultural
land and roads.
Clearance of grazing areas in general is more difficult to justify in narrow economic
terms than de-mining of other types of land, because of the lower productivity of the land
concerned. An economic loss will regularly be experienced when techniques other than
dogs or community-based methods are applied. The Northern Region of Afghanistan
provides the weakest justification for clearance tasks of all types.
Mine dog clearance is overall the most superior technique with the highest benefit-cost
ratio; no other technique gives higher return for any specific clearance task. Dogs should
consequently be used wherever this technique is applicable.
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Currently about half of the area de-mined is cleared by dogs, which substantially reduces
the overall average costs of MAPA. Although some types of mined lands are not suitable
for clearance by dogs, this is not the constraint on this technique at present. With more
dogs available, including larger training capacity for dogs, this technique could be further
expanded.
Mechanical clearance is costly to MAPA. This technique should evidently be applied
only when no other options are feasible, and economic justification will have to be
demonstrated on a case-by-case basis.
A first item on the agenda for socio-economic assessment of a particular clearance task
should always be to ascertain that the area will be reclaimed for use immediately. Delays
in putting cleared areas to productive use sharply reduce the economic benefits of demining.
The net benefits of the MAPA mine clearance programme for 1999 are estimated at 40
million USD, with a solid Benefit-Cost Ratio of 1.5. The largest portion of the net
economic benefits originates from clearance of agricultural land with dogs. Clearance of
agricultural land and irrigation systems with manual methods as well as roads with dogs
also make strong contributions.
It is strongly recommended that MAPA start conducting cost benefit analysis of clearance
activities on a regular basis and in particular related to the annual presentation of the
programme work-plan to the donor community. In this context, community participation
in the planning and prioritisation of mine clearance activities be increased.
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1.

Objectives of Analysis

The World Bank is currently funding an Afghanistan Watching Brief Project. This
project aims at improving the World Bank’s and the United Nations Development
Programme's (UNDP) understanding of the present economic situation in and the
prospects for Afghanistan. The World Bank and UNDP with partners have recognised the
need for strengthening by means of analyses of key issues related to the country’s
economic and social recovery, reconstruction and development.
The World Bank and UNDP likewise want to enhance their ability to contribute
meaningfully in areas of their comparative advantage, to initiatives by the international
assistance community to better co-ordinate, prioritise and implement aid to Afghanistan.
Underlying their objectives is the need for these agencies to become better prepared at an
early stage to actively participate when a post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation
scenario emerges in Afghanistan, including help to prepare a transitional support strategy
if/when required.
The Afghanistan Watching Brief Project has three components:
– Economic and sector studies.
– Workshops and conferences.
– Small pilot programs for learning, training and networking for Afghan women
and NGOs based in Pakistan.
This Study, analysing the socio-economic cost-benefit impacts of mine action in
Afghanistan is one of six projects under the component “Economic and sector studies.”
According to its Terms of Reference (ToR ) the Study will “analyse the problem of
mines, the cost-benefits of mine operations and how to deal with the mine problem from
an integrated socio-economic perspective.”
In particular the following study areas are mentioned:
– The number and causes of mine victims.
– Socio-economic costs of mine problems.
– Techniques for mine clearance
– Mine awareness and other interventions to reduce mine accidents.
The ToR encompass a wide scope with a number of issues. It has nonetheless been
agreed that the main focus of the technical part of the Study will be on tangible economic
impacts of mine action, benefits and costs of clearing units of land of different types with
the actual choice of de-mining techniques.
These are important aspects, since not many efforts have been launched internationally
on the economic evaluation of mine action although its high costs are beginning to be
questioned by some donors. Local community involvement too has also often been
lacking in mine action programmes. What happens to the land after clearance has not
usually been an important concern for the clearing agencies.
Most assessments of mine action programmes still refer to the size of areas contaminated
and to the numbers of mines and Un-exploded Ordnance (UXO). In fact this can be a
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fairly poor indicator of the severity of the threat. It cannot reveal the extent of impact on
people’s lives and well-being, nor does it consider the impact in the context of the many
other post-conflict development priorities. Renewed access to social infrastructure and
use of land, food security and reduced transportation costs could provide much better
indicators of the success of mine action programmes.
The Socio-economic Impact Study (SEIS) undertaken by the Mine Action Programme for
Afghanistan (MAPA) in 1999 was actually one of the first attempts anywhere in the
world to examine benefits and costs of mine action in a wider context. Another study has
been launched recently by UNDP to be carried out by the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining.

2.

Afghanistan – Society and Economy

Afghanistan’s topography ranges from snow-covered high altitude peaks of up to 7,500
m, to deeply incised fertile valleys and large desert plains. Climate varies from arid in the
South and Southwest to semi-arid in most other parts of the country. Irrigation dates back
to more than 4500 years.
Three quarters of the land supports only sparse grazing in mountains and deserts, while
the 5% comprising irrigated valley floors accounts for 85% of all agricultural output. In
1978 the last year of peace, the country was largely self-sufficient in food and a
significant exporter of agricultural products.
There is evidence suggesting that the natural vegetation of large parts of Afghanistan was
originally woodland and forest. The present steppes have resulted from cutting of wood
by man and grazing and browsing by domestic animals over millennia. Trends towards
resource depletion thus started long ago. Still, the forest cover reduction over the last 20
years has been severe. In 8 provinces the forest cover seems to have disappeared
completely.1
In Afghanistan a severe drought appears to be a consequence of low winter rainfall in two
consecutive years. Rainfall records suggest that low winter rainfall in two successive
years occurs at least every 28 to 30 years.
In 1979 the total population of Afghanistan was estimated at 14 million, while 18-20
million has been indicated for today. Before the war about 85% of the people lived in
rural villages, including 1.5 million nomads. Most of the other 15% were also connected
indirectly with rural enterprises.
About 70% of the total labour force were engaged in agriculture, livestock and livestock
based handicrafts, making woollen carpets and rugs. There was some industrial
development, mostly linked to the processing of agricultural products or the production
of farm inputs such as fertiliser from newly found gas fields.
Even before the war Afghanistan was one of the world’s least developed countries. The
past 20 years of continuing conflict have further exacerbated poverty, deprivation and
suffering. Local and national institutions of governance have collapsed, the economy has
1

Source: FAO 1997, Afghanistan Agricultural Strategy.
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been devastated, and basic productive and social service infrastructures have been
shattered. For the past several years Afghanistan has remained at the bottom of the UN
Human Development Index.
During the war over one third of the population fled the country with Pakistan and Iran
sheltering about 3 million refugees each. Probably another million of internally displaced
persons moved into and around urban areas within Afghanistan. By 1995 about 1.4
million Afghans still remained in Pakistan and 2 million in Iran.
Since 1980 output in all sectors has fallen substantially because of the war and the
resulting disruption and destruction of production infrastructure, as well as transport and
trade opportunities. Afghanistan is now highly dependent on farming, wheat in particular
and livestock, raising of sheep and goats etc. Large parts of the population suffer from
insufficient food, clothing, housing and medical care.
Still the agricultural production system of Afghanistan can be described as robust and
resilient, continuing to supply the remaining rural population under conditions of extreme
difficulty during the war.2
The situation of the Afghan economy in 1991 has been described as follows:3
– Exports amount to USD 188 million, consisting of fruit and nuts, hand-woven
carpets, wool, cotton, hides and pelts, precious and semi-precious gems.
– Imports of USD 616 million consist of food and petroleum products together
with other consumer goods.
– The country has an external debt of USD 2300 million.
For the year 1995-96 the contribution of the livestock sector to the gross domestic
product (GDP) has been calculated at USD 469 million, rising to USD 507 million in
1998-99.4
Many activities with considerable economic impacts tend to by-pass official statistics.
There is a large-scale influx to Afghanistan of remittances from Afghans abroad.
Although the actual amounts mostly remain unknown as yet, this source of revenue is
considered indispensable for the survival of many local households.
The illegal and internationally condemned trade in drugs, mainly opium from poppy
plantations inside the country, is the basis of wealth and power for groups of Afghans and
foreigners and constitutes a boost to the economy in general. Farmers that have their land
cleared of mines under the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan are obliged to sign a
document stating that this area will not be used for poppy growing.
The forest regions of the country currently experience large-scale cutting of wood on a
non-sustainable basis, for domestic consumption and for exports. A trade in antiques
persists, in precious objects some of them looted from museums, depriving the country of
its national heritage.
2

UNDP 1993: Afghanistan Rehabilitation Strategy
Source: ABC Country Book of Afghanistan.
4
Source: Role and size of livestock sector in Afghanistan, World Bank 2000, page 22.
3
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Inflation remains a serious problem throughout the country. In May 1996 the local
currency the Afghani (Afs) had an exchange rate of 12,000 to the dollar. By November
the same year the rate was 15,000 Afs. In September 2000 the rate of exchange was about
60,000 Afs to the dollar.
Table 2.1:

Development of the Afghan currency (Afs) over the years, exchange rate
towards one USD.
Year
Dec 2000
Sept 2000
1998
Nov 1996
May 1996
1994
1993
1990
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Afs exchange rate
To one USD
70,000
60,000
32,000
15,000
12,000
3,000
1,000
400

4

3.

The History of Mines in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is among the most mine-affected countries in the world. During the Soviet
occupation 1978-89 and the subsequent war between Afghan government troops and the
mujahedin, landmines were used indiscriminately by all sides in the war. Mines were
used for conventional military purposes, and also as part of the Soviet strategy to
depopulate villages to prevent local support for the mujahedin. Mines were therefore
placed in houses, irrigation systems, agricultural land and grazing areas, as well as being
used for conventional military purposes on roads and around military establishments.

200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Un
sp
ec
ifie
d
19
74
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98

2

Km .

Minefields in km 2 by year of mining

Year

Figure 3.1: Minefields in km2 by year of mining, high and low priority areas. Source:
MIS Survey Database.
Large areas were contaminated in the mid-1980s, with new deployment taking place in
the mid-1990s. Local people are the main source of information here.
Conventional forces used mines to force people off the land and to reduce potential
support for their enemies. Guerrilla forces used mines to block roads and to harass
opponents. Modern delivery systems enabled mines to be scattered by helicopters and
other aircraft.
Landmines and UXO are scattered throughout the country in urban and commercial
areas, towns and villages as well as on farmland. Mine and UXO contamination affects
28 out of the 29 provinces with heavier concentrations and greater impact in the eastern
region, including Kabul and in the southern and western regions.
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By end of October 2000 the remaining area contaminated by landmines is estimated at
718 km2 , spread throughout the whole country. Of this 339 km2 are assessed to be vitally
important residential areas, commercial land, roads, irrigation systems and primary
production land. An equally significant problem is posed by UXO littered throughout the
country.
Table 3.1: Mine contamination in Afghanistan, situation by year 20005.
Area km2
Total mine contaminated area identified to date

938

– of which high priority area

560

Area cleared to date – all high priority

220

Remaining area to be cleared

718

Remaining high priority area to be cleared

339

– Agricultural areas

153

– Residential and commercial land
– Irrigation systems and canals
– Roads

14
3
32

– Grazing areas

137

National data on the rate of mine and UXO casualties are not available, but the limited
data that have been collected show a grim picture. Non-combatant casualties may still be
as high as 150 to 300 a month, but many more are believed to die before receiving
medical treatment.
It is estimated that access to 87,500 houses has been blocked by landmines6 , constituting
one of the major obstacles to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to
their villages.
Current assessments indicate that if the remaining 339 km2 of high priority mined area
can be cleared, most Afghans could resume a normal, productive life. This will take some
7-10 years if current funding levels for mine clearing are maintained. The extent of new
mining throughout the country was investigated in 1998 and again in late 1999 by MAPA
and, while a concern it does not appear to be substantial.
It is clear, however, that minefields are still being discovered, at a rate of 12-14 km2 a
year. These areas were mined years ago, but are discovered by MAPA when different
parts of the country become accessible. In Afghanistan the actual extent of known
minefields is increasing.

5
6

Source: MAPA Survey Database.
Source: SEIS page 16.
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Table 3.2: New minefields found, in km2 .
Year

2000-Oct.

1999

1998

1997

1996

km2

12.5

16.4

14.0

15.6

13.6

In table 3.2 both high and low priority mined areas are included.
During the years of war from 1978 onwards, up to one third of the population fled the
country or was internally dispersed. Many farming areas were depopulated. In 1993 the
UN launched an emergency relief and rehabilitation programme for Afghanistan, to
enable and encourage people to return to their homes. A key element of this programme
was to bring agricultural land back into production, to provide food and employment for
the returnees. This required significant efforts in removing mines and UXO from access
roads and agricultural land, and restoring abandoned irrigation systems.
In many countries it is observed that the number of dead and injured from mine accidents
tends to peak as refugees and displaced persons return to their homesteads. It then
descends rapidly over the following months and years, even in quite severely affected
countries.
The peak years for mine incidents in Afghanistan is believed to correspond with periods
of large-scale repatriation. One peak year could have been 1988, when the Soviet army
began its withdrawal. There was an upsurge of mujahedin activity and some Afghans
repatriated voluntarily. No survey or clearance had taken place by that time and
minefields were active and unmarked. In 1990, the year after the final withdrawal of
Russian troops there was also some repatriation into the country.
During the period 1992-1994 some 2.5 million Afghans returned home. Following this
spontaneous repatriation, a considerable increase in the number of victims is believed to
have taken place. The deficient victims’ statistics can, however, not provide any
confirmation here.

4.

The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan

The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) started operations in 1989. Since
then the programme has expanded from a few hundred de-miners assisted by a dozen
foreign experts to a workforce of some 4800 Afghans and fewer than 10 expatriates.
MAPA comprises the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA), four UN
Regional Mine Action Centres (RMAC), and 15 implementing partners (NGO). In the
absence of an indigenous national co-ordinating body, MACA plans, manages and
oversees all mine action activities for Afghanistan as well as providing technical support
and ensuring the proper integration of mine action into the humanitarian assistance
programme of the country. The 15 NGOs implement most of the physical activities
associated with mine action, including awareness raising, technical training, survey and
clearance.
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MAPA’s field of activities comprises:
– Surveying and clearing of minefields and former battlefields.
– Mine and UXO awareness and education.
– Technical training and programme development.
– Advocacy: The Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines.
– Landmine survivors rehabilitation and reintegration.
– Programme management.
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Figure 4.1: Clearance of minefields and former battlefields, in km2 by year.
MAPA has pioneered the development of a number of innovative techniques to enhance
the output of humanitarian de-mining teams, including the use of backhoes in urban
areas, and the large-scale deployment of mine-detection dogs.
During its 10 years of activity the programme has cleared 220 km2 of minefields and over
300 km2 of contaminated former battlefields, removing over 220,000 mines and 1.2
million pieces of un-exploded ordnance (UXO) in the process.
Table 4.1: Clearance of minefields and former battlefields, 1990-2000, km2.
year
Minefields
Battlefields

1990-2000 1999
220.6 34.2
303.7 75.7

1998 1997 1996
33.5 32.6 21.6
39.1 49.2 34.1

1995 1994 1993
23.9 20.7
9.9
19.5 22.7

1992 1991 1990
7.4 10.2
6.4

Despite political divisions within the country MAPA has been able to operate
successfully in all areas. The programme continues to have strong support and
recognition from the conflicting factions in the Afghan population in general as well as
from the international community.
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The major part of the NGOs’ funding is channelled through the UNOCHA Afghan
Emergency Trust Fund (AETF), which is administered by UN Geneva. Some NGOs,
however, obtain financing directly from donors.
Table 4.2: Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, AETF funding in million USD and
cost per m2 of minefields cleared over the period 1991 to 1999.
Year
USD mill.
USD/m2 minefield

1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991
22.1 22.2 20.2 17.7 15.6 16.9 17.4 11.1
7.9
0.6
0.7
0.6
0.8
0.7
0.8
1.8
1.5
0.8

Table 4.2 shows the development of the MAPA funding through AETF for the period
1991 to 1999. It also gives the cost of clearing in USD per m2 . Costs have come down
significantly over the period. The figure USD 0.6 per m2 is frequently used in MAPA
information as cost of mine clearance.7 Still, some other factors should be taken into
account to give a more complete picture:
– AETF is not the only source of funding. Some NGOs receive support, financial and
in kind, directly from donors. Information about this support has not been collected
for the MAPA annual reports for previous years, while all cleared areas are reported
as MAPA activity.
– Table 4.2 gives costs as USD per m2 minefield cleared. MAPA activities, however,
also comprise clearance of former battlefields, over 300 km2 in the period 19902000 as compared to about 220 km2 of minefields. The time (in team-hours) it takes
to clear a former battlefield is less than 1/30 of the time to clear a minefield of equal
size. Still, clearance of former battlefields is not a negligible part of the activity and
must have some influence on the cost of the programme.
– MAPA is also engaged in other activities financed under the same budget, mine
awareness in particular. Some of the NGOs supported by MAPA are engaged in
mine awareness only, a few are active in both mine clearing and mine awareness.
Mine awareness constitutes USD 1.8 million out of the total USD 26.3 million
(about 7%) requested by MAPA as funding for the year 2000.
After survey (level 2), minefields and former battlefields are given priority as to which
ones should be cleared first. Taking the decision on this is normally the responsibility of
MAPA’s four Regional Mine Action Centres (RMAC) in accordance with the following
guidelines:

7

See for example MAPA: Annual Workplan for Year 2000, page 32.
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1st Priority:
Agricultural land, road, housing/ residential area and irrigation system,
expected to be reclaimed immediately by users.
2nd Priority:

Do. In use after 6 months.

3rd Priority:

Do. In use after 2-3 years.

4th Priority:

Grazing area, some agriculture or roads.

5th Priority:

Grazing area only.

The areas declared to be of high priority in table 3.1 will correspond to 1st Priority here,
some grazing areas have also been considered high priority.

5.

Human loss

5.1
Mine victims in Afghanistan
The devastating toll on human lives and health is unquestionably the most cruel impact of
mines and UXO. Still, information on the human loss is to a large degree deficient, as
most data collection on mine victims in Afghanistan suffers from lack of reliability and
co-ordination.
Studies exist and data continue to be collected regularly by various agencies like ICRC,
MAPA, Save the Children and local NGOs. The question is to what degree the data are
representative and provide information about the situation in the whole country. They can
not constitute a total count, since there is evidence that many accidents involving dead
and wounded people are not reported anywhere. The data collection is not based on any
well-conceived sampling technique, and double counting may occur among the agencies
involved.
As a result different sources give widely varying figures for the number of mine victims
in Afghanistan:
–

The MAPA Annual Workplan for the year 2000 states that the number of mine
accident casualties may still be as high as 150 to 300 a month, but it adds that
many more are believed to die before receiving medical treatment.8

–

The SEIS study’s estimate for recent years (1997) is 10-12 a day or 300-360 a
month, decreasing from 20-24 people a day or 600-720 a month in 1993.

–

ICRC (Red Cross) in Kabul’s assessment is of 300 to 500 a month based on mine
casualties arriving at their hospitals.

The AMVIS initiative estimates the total accumulated number of victims (dead and
survivors) to be around 60,000 by year 2000. SEIS presents estimates for the total
number of landmine victims amounting to 90,000-104,000 as of the end of 1997.

8

MAPA: Annual Workplan for Year 2000, page 16.
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The SEIS study, based on data from 5140 victims, gives the following information:
Under 18 years: 34%

18 to 40 years: 53%

Over 40: 13%

Age groups
Male: 96%

Female: 4%

Male/female
Death: 31%

Blind: 6% Amputation: 40% Severe injury: 12% Light: 11%

Casualties
0%

10 %

20 %

30 %

40 %

50 %

60 %

70 %

80 %

90 %

Figure 5.1: Mines/UXO caused injuries, % of injured persons in reported accidents.9
From the SEIS study it appears that the vast majority (96%) of civilian mine and UXO
casualties is male. Afghan men may be more exposed to mines than women in their daily
activities. It might also be the case that women casualties are severely underreported, and
that they are less likely than men to present themselves for treatment at hospitals.
The death rate among the reported casualties is about 30%, and a further 40% have to
undergo amputation. The serious categories of injuries make up altogether about 90% of
the registered casualties. It can be suspected that light injuries seldom are reported.
The SEIS study also observes that a considerable share (about 40%) of the victims were
educated, with at least completed primary education. About half of the victims were
responsible for supporting their families.
The ICRC Orthopaedic Project in Afghanistan is located in 5 centres, situated in Kabul,
Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad and Gulbahar. Since the beginning in 1988 over 36,000
patients have been registered. Due to the large demand and the almost complete absence
of other structures, the assistance was extended in 1995 to non-amputees and non-war
wounded patients as well.
Out of the total number of amputees at the ICRC centres, 78% are registered as victims of
mines, 70% are civilians, 82% adult males, 8% boys less than 14 years of age, 7%
women and 3% girls less than 14 years. The ICRC figures thus likewise emerge with a
small proportion of females among the mine victims.
An attempt is made to estimate the total number of mine victims by combining the ICRC
and SEIS data:

9

MCPA: Socio-Economic Impact Study 1999 (SEIS).
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– The patients registered with ICRC also comprise non-civilians and non-mine
victims. This has been corrected on account of information from ICRC.
– ICRC informs that patients include amputees and to some extent nonamputees. In the SEIS survey, amputees constitute 40% of all registered mine
victims on the average, other severe injuries 12%. It is assumed here that the
ICRC patients comprise all amputees and half of the severely injured from
mine accidents.
On this basis the total number of civilian mine victims can be estimated for the period
1995 to 2000 as shown in table 5.1.
Table 5.1:

Mine victims 1995-2000, Calculated figures based on ICRC and SEIS
information.
Civilian mine victims
Mine victims/month
- Deaths/month

2000-April 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995
2062 7553 6089 5872 5989 3661
515 629 507 489 499 305
155 189 152 147 150
92

The number of mine victims remains at about 500 per month for most of the years in the
period, including a forecast for the year 2000 based on 4 months registration. In 1999
there was a marked increase and in 1995 the number of patients registered at ICRC was
lower than for other years in the period.
In the Report of the National Survey of Mines Situation from 199310 a total of 339
districts in all 29 provinces of Afghanistan were surveyed. Mine problems were reported
in 162 of these districts. Surveys could not be carried out in 17 districts due to security
problems and 177 districts were reported free of mines.
In the surveyed communities it was found that over 20,000 people had been killed and
about 16,000 disabled through mine accidents. With this background the survey report
states that 20-25 mine incidents involving the civilian population occur in Afghanistan
every day, or about 8000 every year. The percentage of deaths in this survey is 55%, that
is to say higher than the 31% recorded in the SEIS study from 1999.
A (rapid) regression analysis of the data from the 1993 National Survey gives a clear
indication that the number of mine victims is causally related to the extent of high
priority mined areas and population (number of families) in the area. The extent of low
priority areas seems to be of little significance, as could be expected. A problem with the
1993 survey from an analysis point of view is the lacking information about the period of
time when accidents took place, while information about the specific mined area (extent,
type etc.) where the accident took place lacks in the SEIS.
For further analysis it would be most convenient to apply an Accident Risk concept,
meaning the danger represented by an active minefield, expressed in terms of the
expected number of casualties per year and per km2 of mined area. Given the deficient
10

MCPA 1993: Report of the National Survey of Mines Situation.
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statistics on mine victims in Afghanistan, such calculations will, however, be largely
speculative.
Not only the number of mine victims will be uncertain here, but also the extent of the
mined areas the accidents refer to. New areas still continue to be identified with their
share of high priority fields. While the high priority areas identified as of the beginning of
the year 2000 amounted to 530 km2 , the real area could be as much as 600 km2. Out of
these 200 km2 are cleared, leaving 400 km2 as the actual high priority mined area in
Afghanistan in year 2000.
The corresponding number of mine victims can be estimated at 4000 as of the year 2000.
This figure is not meant to comprise the total civilian mine and UXO victims in
Afghanistan, but only victims from accidents taking place within the 400 km2 of high
priority minefields assumed to exist by year 2000. Mine accidents taking place elsewhere,
on low priority areas and victims from UXO accidents on former battlefields come in
addition. The 4000 mine victims per year thus constitute the casualties that could be
avoided if all the 400 km2 high priority areas were cleared. This assumption gives an
Accident Risk of 10 victims annually per km2 in high priority mined area in Afghanistan.
Table 5.2: Basic assumptions for calculation of accident risk.
Year
Identified high priority mined area km2.
Actual high priority mined area km2 .
Cleared minefields km2 .
Existing, active high priority minefields km2 .
Total number of victims/year
Victims per day
Victims/km2 mined area/year

2000
530
600
200
400
4000
11
10

Different types of mined areas will generate various accident risks, and those close to
populated areas will normally be the most exposed. It is often found that mined
residential/commercial areas, irrigation canals, and roads carry the largest risk, whilst
agricultural areas carry somewhat less and grazing areas the least risk of mine accidents,
but more substantial information is lacking here. It will be assumed that agricultural land
is 2 times, and residential areas 3 times more prone to mine accidents than grazing areas.
The minefields considered here are all presumed to qualify as MAPA high priority areas.
This provides the basis for the risk calculations presented in table 5.3 on the number of
victims annually per km2 mined land of different types. The accident risks for each type
of land are conceived so that when multiplied with the actual distribution on types of
areas, the total number of victims on the 400 km2 remaining mined land will amount to
4000, that is to say an average of 10 victims per km2 per year.
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Table 5.3:

Risk of mine accidents. Number of victims annually per km2 on types of
mined area.
Type of area
Residential/commercial
Roads
Irrigation systems
Agricultural land
Grazing areas
Average/total

Victims/km2
17
17
17
11
6
10

5.2
Valuation of lost quality of human life, welfare and production capacity
In principle the methods for valuation of human loss from accidents are based on the
resources needed to correct the effects of the accident. Estimates are made for what it
would cost society to restore the victim or his/her relatives and friends to the situation in
which they found themselves before the accident. The Human Capital Approach
measures the loss to society when one of its members dies or becomes disabled, based on
the value of working time or value of production the individual is responsible for.
According to this method the cost of death and disablement is calculated on basis of the
lost future productive potential of the victim. Production for future years is discounted to
the present date, by means of a discount rate, suggested as 10% in this study.
Production may be calculated in gross or net terms. In the latter case expenditure on
consumption is deducted, leaving the production loss to society excluding the victim. The
Value of Lost Lifetime Years method attempts to determine also the value of the leisure
time, in addition to the cost of the working time. The loss of enjoyment suffered by the
victim on his death is not limited to deprivation of consumption. It extends to cover the
fact that he can no longer undertake other activities promoting his well being.11
Many European countries, Australia and USA apply methods for valuation of human life
and injuries to humans in connection with road accident prevention programmes. A
fatality can be evaluated to as much as USD 2 million and a very serious injury as USD
1.5 million. This can contribute to justify a large amount of road safety initiatives, some
of them quite costly to the road transport sector.
The method selected for evaluating damage to human life and health from mine accidents
in Afghanistan will be close to the Value of Lost Lifetime Years approach. It will include
loss of productive capacity to society and reduced opportunities for the victim to conduct
activities important for personal welfare, concerning for example private consumption
and quality of leisure time. The calculations presented here will constitute a first
approach to introducing the value of reduced human loss as benefits from mine clearance
activities in Afghanistan. Both the method applied and the data input should be subject to
further development and revision as part of the planned continuation of work on social
and economic studies in this field.
11

European Commission Transport Research Cost 313: Socioeconomic cost of road accidents, 1994.
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The starting point for these calculations will be an estimate of the social value of
production for an individual mine victim. Information about age structure and social
status of the mine victims is extracted from figure 5.1. The SEIS study observes that a
considerable share (about 40%) of the victims were educated, with at least completed
primary education, and that about half of the victims were responsible for supporting
their families. It can thus be assumed that most mine victims belonging to the
economically active age groups (18-65 years) are contributing positively to the Gross
National product (GNP). Nonetheless an unemployment rate of 40% will be applied. The
economic situation of mine victims is thus different from refugees or internally displaced
persons returning to reclaim land cleared of mines, who generally will be assumed to
have no alternative possibilities for employment (see chapter 6.3).
The GNP of a poor country can be as little as USD 200 per inhabitant per year. For
Afghanistan as of to day no such statistics exist, and for this analysis forecasts of a more
normal, non-war situation expected in future years would also be needed.
It can be assumed that the larger part of the GNP is created by people in the age-group
20-65 years. By applying estimates for the number of persons in that age group in
Afghanistan12 and an unemployment rate of 40%, it can be shown that each active,
employed person in a poor country could contribute about USD 750 annually to the GDP.
This will be used as an estimate of the potential annual economic contribution from a
mine victim (96% of them males) in the age groups 18 to 40 years and above 40 years,
but also for young persons, once they come of productive age.
The GNP comprises private consumption, but is limited to marketed goods and services
only. The value of non marketed activity and production for own use will have to be
added, which could increase the production value estimate to USD 850 per person and
year.
The victim’s personal loss of welfare can be assumed to be at least equal to the
individual’s productive contribution. The estimate used here will be another USD 850 per
person per year, while estimates from industrialised countries often constitute a much
larger additional percentage.
Table 5.4: Estimates of productive contribution and loss of welfare for mine victims.
Contribution to GNP
Value of non-marketed, subsistence production
Productive contribution from an economic active mine victim

USD/year
750
100
850

Victim loss of welfare

850

A 30-year-old male can be used as representative for the middle of the age group 18-40
used for mine victims. His remaining life expectancy is about 35 years in Afghanistan13 .
12
13

Mohammad Ershad: Paper on the population of Afghanistan, IIPS Bombay, June 1983.
Ibid
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There is also a risk of loss of a person’s productive capacity for other reasons than death
and mine accidents. An average productive lifetime of 30 years will thus be assumed for
the age group 18-40 years. For the age group over 40, the productive lifetime is set at 10
years and life expectancy at 15 years. Victims under 18 are attributed a remaining life
expectancy of 50 years and a remaining productive life time of 40 years when they come
of productive age, on the average after 10 years. Future contributions are all discounted at
a 10% rate.
The individual age groups of the population in Afghanistan will contribute to the
production value and welfare loss as of their share among the mine victims, which is
known from figure 5.1. For calculation of the production value an unemployment rate of
40% is assumed.
Total loss is calculated in table 5.5, that is to say when the victim can no longer
contribute anything to production in society or experience personal welfare any more.
This will be the case with fatal casualties only, while the loss for other categories of
victims depends inter alia on their degree of disability (see chapter 5.4).
Table 5.5: Production and welfare loss per person, fatal casualty, USD.
Production loss
Age group under 18
Age group 18-40
Age group over 40
Welfare loss
Age group under 18
Age group 18-40
Age group over 40

Years

Loss USD
% of victims
over lifetime
3 211
34
8 013
53
5 223
13

Loss USD
relative share
655
2 548
407

50
8 434
34
35
8 198
53
15
6 465
13
Economic loss per person fatal casualty

2 868
4 345
840
11 663

40 (+10)
30
10

5.3
Medical costs
Mine victims constitute a heavy burden on the scarce resources available for medical
treatment in Afghanistan. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reports
that over 80% of all amputations performed at their hospitals are victims of landmines.
Patients having sustained injuries from a landmine will need hospital treatment for about
30 days on the average. The cost per patient-day at an ICRC hospital is around USD 120,
excluding salaries for expatriate staff. The average cost for treating a mine-injured person
in hospital will then be around USD 3500.
For most Afghan families this would be an unattainable amount. At ICRC hospitals all
treatment is free of charge, still treatment capacity will be diverted from other patients,
which means employment of resources that have an alternative use. The victim and
his/her family may also have to cover additional expenses like transport etc.
Still, many victims do not receive professional medical treatment, which contributes to
increase the death-toll and severity of invalidisation from accidents. Medical costs per
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victim can thus be reduced somewhat compared to the hospital rates. It is assumed here
that medical costs will amount to USD 2000 per victim for casualties leading to
blindness, amputation and severe injuries.
5.4
Total human loss in economic terms
The economic loss set out in table 5.5 will constitute the loss from a fatal human casualty,
while mine accidents in Afghanistan has a death toll estimated at 31% of the victims. The
proportion of different types of casualties will thus have to be taken into account, with
their respective degree of disability.
The contribution of each category of mine victims to the economic loss from human
casualties is shown in table 5.6. This will depend on the degree of disability of each
category and its share among the mine victims. Medical costs are also added with USD
2000 per victim for casualties leading to blindness, amputation and severe injuries. The
economic loss for a typical mine victim is calculated to about USD 9000.
Table 5.6: Economic loss for a typical mine victim, USD.
Categories
Disability %
Death
100 %
Blind
70 %
Amputation
60 %
Severe injury
50 %
Light injury
20 %
Economic loss for a typical mine victim

Victims %
31 %
6%
40 %
12 %
11 %

Loss USD
3 616
610
3 599
940
257
9 021

The total human loss in economic terms can now be distributed by the various types of
mined area according to the accident risk estimates presented in table 5.3. As long as the
areas are not cleared, the risk of mine accidents will persist and incidents with human
casualties may continue to reoccur every year. A period of 15 years into the future will be
considered here, over which the human loss will be calculated and discounted at 10%.
Experience shows, however, that accidents risk from active mined areas may decrease
somewhat over time, even when no clearance has been conducted. Local people may be
able to adapt themselves in some ways to the danger, taking precautions and modifying
their behaviour. Mine awareness campaigns will have significant impact here, as well as
survey, delimitation and marking of the minefields. There might thus be some costs
related to the risk reduction. Return of refugees will often counteract the trend and
increase accident rates.
It is assumed here that the accident rates will decrease by 5% every year over the 15
years period considered in case of no mine clearance.
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Table 5.7:

Human loss in USD 1000 from risk of accidents on different types of mined
area per km2 , annually and over 15 years discounted at 10%.

Type of area
Residential/commercial
Roads
Irrigation systems
Agricultural land
Grazing areas
Average for all mined areas
One victim each year over 15 years**

Accident risk
Annual loss Total human loss over
victims/km2
USD 1000 15 years, USD 1000*
17
154
914
17
154
914
17
154
914
11
103
610
6
51
305
10
90
535
1
9
69

* A reduction in accident risk of 5% per year over the 15 years period is assumed.
* * No risk reduction assumed.

Wit an accident risk of 10 victims per km2 minefield, the total human loss as an average
for all types of areas is calculated here at USD 90,000 annually. This amounts to more
than USD 0.5 million when the area remains uncleared during a 15 years period (loss
discounted at 10% annually). Each type of mined area represents different degrees of
accident risk, and the human loss from accidents varies accordingly. The total human loss
over 15 years from mine accidents constitutes one of the benefit components to be
compared with the cost of clearing mined areas in the further analysis.
5.5
Alternative assumptions
Although mine accidents unquestionably lead to major human welfare losses, these are
difficult and somewhat arbitrary to ascertain and inevitably a source of contention no
matter what estimates or methodology are used. More thorough analysis will be needed
to show whether the welfare loss estimate of USD 850 per person per year is appropriate
for a country in Afghanistan’s situation.
The welfare losses can be excluded for the purpose of sensitivity analysis, not because
these are unimportant or necessarily overstated by the study, but rather to come up with a
conservative estimate of the economic benefits of de-mining that are directly attributable
to economic activities. Table 5.8 shows the resulting changes in assumptions as compared
to table 5.7.
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Table 5.8:

Alternative assumption excluding welfare loss. Human loss in USD 1000
from risk of accidents on different types of mined area per km2 , annually
and over 15 years discounted at 10%.

Type of area
Residential/commercial
Roads
Irrigation systems
Agricultural land
Grazing areas
Average for all mined areas
One victim each year over 15 years**

Accident risk
Annual loss Total human loss over
Victims/km2
USD 1000 15 years, USD 1000*
17
61
364
17
61
364
17
61
364
11
41
243
6
20
121
10
36
213
1
4
27

* A reduction in accident risk of 5% per year over the 15 years period is assumed.
* * No risk reduction assumed.

6.

Agricultural land blocked by mines

6.1
The agricultural sector’s role in the Afghan economy
Afghanistan is an agricultural country, and traditionally around 70% of the labour force
was engaged in agriculture related activities. Agricultural produce was also one of the
main components of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Before 1979 the contribution
from agricultural products made up more than 50 % of total GDP.
In 1978, the year of the Soviet invasion, the country was largely self-sufficient in food
and a significant exporter of agricultural products. Official Afghan statistics from the
period 1971-89 show an annual exportation of agricultural products of more than USD
100 million, constituting over 30% of the total export of the country. The main export
items were fresh and dried fruits, citrus and oil seeds. After the intensification of war
activities, agricultural production decreased considerably
In Afghanistan 85% of the agricultural output comes from about 5% of the land, that is
the fertile and productive river valleys, which to a large extent consist of irrigated areas.
Three quarters of the land on the contrary supports only sparse extensive grazing in
mountains and deserts.
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Table 6.1: Land area and use of land in Afghanistan, 197214
km2
Irrigated land
– Orchards
– Cereal crops, 2 times a year
– Cereal crops, once a year
– Intermittently cropped
Total irrigated
Rainfed-only 20-25% cropped every year
Forest area
Rangeland and other
Total land area

%

%

802
2
4,514 14
7,337 22
20,230 62
32,883 100
5
48,357
8
19,870
3
541,285
84
642,395
100

Table 6.2 gives the production of principal crops and estimated productivity in tonnes per
km2 .
Table 6.2: Principal types of crops and yield in Afghanistan, estimates for 1996.15
Area km2

Productivity
tonnes/km2
36,000
170
3,100
115
4,850
170
2,150
210
800
145
45
2
20
2
700
43
900
790

Wheat
Barley
Maize
Rice
Cotton
Sugar cane
Sugar beet
Fruit orchards, citrus
Vegetables

Sharecropping has traditionally been a characteristic feature of agriculture in
Afghanistan. Dupree (1973) explains the principle as follows:
“Basically, agricultural production in Afghanistan involves five elements: land, water,
seed, animal or mechanical power, and human labour. Theoretically, whoever contributes
one of the elements receives one fifth of the resulting crop.” These five elements may be
concentrated in a varying number of hands. Modern agricultural methods have
complicated the agreements. A key element, however, seems to be supplementary labour,
still tending to constitute its traditional one fifth of the crop value.

14
15

Source: FAO Land Use Statistics 1972
Source: FAO Integrated Crop Programme estimates.
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6.2
Mines in agricultural areas
A total of 89 km2 of agricultural land has been cleared of mines during the period 1990 to
2000. According to MAPA’s estimates16 a total of 153 km2 of high priority agricultural
land still remained to be cleared by the end of the year 1999. Another 26 km2 of mine
infested agricultural land were identified and assigned lower priority.
Table 6.3: Mines in agricultural areas, km2 .
Year
Cleared land km2
Remaining by 2000
– High priority
– other area

1990-2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
89.1 17.6 14.1 11.8
8.1
6.6
6.6
153.2
26.2

6.3
The Case Studies
Ideally the statistics used in this Study should be comprehensive and detailed enough to
cover all of Afghanistan, and to give a representative picture of the various areas relevant
in a mine-clearance context. There is, however, a recognised shortage of up-to-date
information about Afghanistan.
It has therefore been necessary to collect and analyse socio-economic data in a limited
number of Case Studies. The individual cases have been designed so as to represent a
wider range of areas in Afghanistan in the best possible way.
Still some concessions were made:
– The areas to be covered by each Case Study will, at this stage, have to
coincide with the boundaries of one or a group of provinces. District level will
be too detailed.
– A restricted number of cases will be selected, while extension to more cases
may come at a later stage when the Study is updated.
In the agriculture and livestock sectors a need for minimum 8 Case Studies has been
identified, in order to cover climatic zones, main cropping and livestock holding patterns,
and cultivation practices.
The case studies are based on farming models, developed from the Swedish Committee
on Afghanistan’s agricultural survey of 1991. They describe the farming systems
prevailing in agro-ecological zones, which can be considered representative of the
climatic variations across the country. The basic features of these models are described in
terms of location, altitude, precipitation, type of irrigation, farm and household size, crop
production, farm inputs, draught power and livestock production.
Cropping intensity will vary among the 8 case studies. Depending on microclimate and
availability of water, some areas with fertile soil and high temperature can be cultivated
16

Source: MAPA Annual Workplan for Year 2000.
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more than once, while other agricultural land can be used every two to three years only.
Some districts of Laghman and Nangarhar for example can be cropped up to three times
per year, whereas some large areas in the Northern Region, rain fed land in particular,
must remain fallow for 3-4 years and even more. The irrigated agricultural lands, which
are not being cropped every year can be used as grazing areas or remain unused so as to
accumulate increased nitrogen content.
Together the model Case Studies are considered to be representative for over 95 % of
irrigated agricultural and 85% of rain fed land. Case Study I covers a mixed extensive
rain fed and irrigated cropping system, whereas the others II-VIII are concerned only
with irrigated cropping systems.
Out of the 29 provinces in Afghanistan only two provinces are not covered by the Case
Studies, that is Bamyan and Ghor. The topography, climate and other characteristics of
these provinces differ widely from the case studies, and further analysis has not been
carried out at this stage. Furthermore these provinces are not densely mined, no clearance
report has yet been received from Ghor, and less than 0.5 km2 have been cleared in
Bamyan.
The Case Studies for the agricultural and livestock sectors cover the following areas:
Table 6.5: Case Study Areas
Case Study

I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII

Provinces, regions
Northern Region all provinces*
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa.
Logar, Wardak.
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
Helmand
Herat, Badghis, Farah, Nimroz

* The Northern Region consists of the provinces of Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz, Baghlan,

Takhar, Badakhstan.

The 8 Case Study areas together with the areas not covered are also shown on the
following map of Afghanistan.
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6.4
Economic benefits from de -mining agricultural land
It is assumed that agricultural areas once cleared of mines will be put directly into
effective use. There is a considerable demand for agricultural land in the country, to feed
its population and to receive returning refugees. Besides, according to the MAPA priority
rules an area will not be given 1st priority for clearance if there is a chance that it will not
be reclaimed for use immediately.
The benefits from agricultural areas consist of the net revenue to the farmer from the
production, which in this report will be calculated on an annual average basis and per km2
of area. For each of the 8 agricultural Case Studies a crop pattern assumed to be
representative for the region has been identified, as types of production and their
percentage share of the area.
Regional variations have also been identified in agricultural practices. The cropping
intensity varies, in particular as a consequence of rainfall and access to irrigation water.
Cropping intensities above 1 signify that more than one crop can normally be harvested a
year. In some regions of Afghanistan certain types of cultivation can be grown every
other or third year only, while other crops may intervene or the area can be used for
grazing.
Regional variations in harvest output have been taken into account, and also in the output
price to farmer to some extent. Factor inputs and their price have been considered
standard for different crops and regions.
It is assumed that cleared land will constitute a means of living for Afghan people who
formerly lacked means to support themselves and their families, as jobless or
substantially underemployed, receiving help either from friends and relatives or from
international organisations, living inside Afghanistan or as refugees in other countries.
For this reason no deduction has been made for farm labour input to agricultural
production, as this input is considered to have no alternative employment as a rule. In
cost-benefit analysis it makes no difference whether the refugees were actually working
abroad, as conventionally benefit and cost counting stop at the national border.
The agricultural practices described in this study are assumed to represent typical patterns
rather than recommended or ideal practice. Still it is not necessarily the actual situation in
Afghanistan today that should taken into account, but the conditions that could be
expected to prevail under more normal and stable conditions and as they could develop in
the future years. In the further analysis the production value over a 15 years period will
be counted as benefits from agricultural land.
On the chapter on agriculture the Study Team has benefited in particular from cooperation with the FAO office in Islamabad as well as different FAO reports and
publications and the survey undertaken by the Swedish Committee of Afghanistan
(SCA). The Team is, however alone responsible for the use of the collected information
for the purpose of this specific Study and the conclusions drawn, in cases when the
source of information is not referred to.
The calculation method applied in the following tables 6.6 to 6.13 for the 8 different Case
Studies can briefly be described as follows:
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– The selection of crops is assumed to be typical for the region contained under
each of the 8 Case Studies.
– Information was gathered from different sources on harvest yield in tonnes per
km2 area for different types of crops, and the average yield per km2
agricultural land is calculated on the basis of figures given in FAO agricultural
models. Some regional variations in output are found.
– The prices used in the calculation of yield in tonnes per km2 are the market
prices for May/June 2000, which are reported through FAO sub-offices from
different regions. A certain regional variation is found in prices of agricultural
produce.
– Harvest yield times price gives the gross revenue of production from one km2
of agricultural land. (This is not shown in the tables 6.6 to 6.13).
– In order to find net revenue the value of the input factors will have to be
deducted. In the tables 6.6 to 6.13 this has been calculated as the amount of
input factors needed for the given output of agricultural crops on one km2 of
land. In the case of irrigated wheat in table 6.6, USD 10,700 worth of input
factors is needed in order to produce 150 tonnes of output. Farm inputs
include seeds, chemical fertilisers, manure, pesticides, hired oxen or tractor
draught power. Labour input was excluded for the reasons discussed above.
– The use of fertiliser and chemical protection material and all other inputs are
estimated according to availability of materials, affordability by the farmers
and accessibility of facilities, while the inputs recommended by the Ministry
of Agriculture and FAO will be much higher than the farm inputs estimated in
this report. Irrigation cost has not been taken into account, because usually
river or Karez water is being used for irrigation purposes except in droughtaffected areas. The cost of management of the farm is also not taken into
account, neither is the farmers’ daily use of farm products such as fruit,
vegetables or firewood.
– For the cost of fertiliser we consider the total active irrigated land and the
amount of fertiliser distributed in the country. A total of 157,700 tonnes of
fertiliser were distributed to farmers in 1986 while the active irrigated land
was 26,000 km2 in 1993. Considering the fertiliser use constant in the period,
the average use of fertiliser will be 6.1 tonnes per km2 . A bag of 50 kg white
fertiliser (UREA) costs around USD 16, so the fertiliser cost per km2 cropland
will be USD 1620.
– Power cost: Usually oxen and tractors are used as power for cultivation of
land. The cost of both types of power is on average USD 2000/km2.
– It has to be taken into account that the provinces covered by the Case Studies
all have cropping intensities different from 1. This means that either more or
less than one crop can be harvested each year. The intensity varies from 0.35
in Case 1 or about one crop in the course of 3 years, to 1.92 in case study IV,
that is almost 2 crops a year normally.
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– When the cropping intensity is lower than 1 it is assumed that the land is
available for grazing animals in years without agricultural planting. The
annual forage value from a km2 of land is assumed to be in line with the
outputs described in chapter 8 on grazing areas.
– The recent exchange rate of 1USD= Afs. 60,000 has been used for converting
monetary values of yield or farm inputs.
Table 6.6: Case Study I, Northern Region*
Annual net revenue from agricultural land, USD per km2 .
Crops

Harvest yield
Price
Input factors Land use Revenues
tonnes/km2
USD/tonne USD per km2
USD
Irrigated wheat
150
252
10700
24 %
2276
Rainfed wheat
94
250
5500
33 %
2079
Barley
80
200
5000
19 %
732
Rice
186
500
8650
24 %
7085
Grazing (remaining part of time)
1349

Annual net revenue USD per km2 agricultural land
Cropping intensity
Grazing time

13521

0.35
0.65

* The Northern Region consists of the provinces of Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar,

Badakhstan.

In each of the tables 6.6 to 6.13 the revenues for each type of crop (last column) is
calculated in the following way: The harvest yield is multiplied by price and the cost of
input factors is subtracted. The remaining net revenue is then multiplied with each crop’s
share (%) of land use and with the cropping intensity specific for each Case Study region.

Table 6.7: Case Study II, The provinces of Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa.
Annual net revenue from agricultural land, USD per km2 .
Crops
Irrigated wheat
Maize
Beans
Forage crops

Harvest yield
Price
Input factors Land use
Revenues
Tonnes/km2
USD/tonne USD per km2
USD
189
252
10700
40 %
23634
88
170
7050
20 %
2531
175
670
8600
30 %
52152
350
34
4850
10 %
1128

Annual net revenue USD per km2 agricultural land
Cropping intensity
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Table 6.8: Case Study III, The provinces of Logar, Wardak.
Annual net revenue from agricultural land, USD per km2 .
Crops

Harvest yield
Price
Input factors Land use Revenues
2
tonnes/km
USD/tonne USD per km2
USD
189
250
10700
23 %
11601
2275
136
15950
18 %
72893
1750
261
8750
18 %
102155
360
35
4850
35 %
3743
175
250
8650
6%
2906

Irrigated wheat
Potato
Fruits
Forage crops
Rice

Annual net revenue USD per km2 agricultural land
Cropping intensity

193298

1.38

Table 6.9: Case Study IV, The provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar.
Annual net revenue from agricultural land, USD per km2 .
Crops

Harvest yield Price
Input factors Land use Revenues
tonnes/km2
USD/tonne USD per km2
USD
189
255
10700
28 %
20157
350
450
8650
38 %
108601
380
38
4850
34 %
6260

Irrigated wheat
Rice
Forage crops

Annual net revenue USD per km2 agricultural land
Cropping intensity

135019

1.92

Table 6.10: Case Study V, The provinces of Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan.
Annual net revenue from agricultural land, USD per km2 .
Crops
Irrigated wheat
Pomegranates
Apples
Apricots
Potato
Forage crops

Harvest yield Price
Input factors Land use Revenues
tonnes/km2
USD/tonne USD per km2
USD
175
250
10700
10 %
4958
2500
320
8750
30 %
356063
1050
335
8750
10 %
51450
525
1 200
8750
10 %
93188
588
140
15950
10 %
9956
370
40
4850
30 %
4478

Annual net revenue USD per km2 agricultural land
Cropping intensity
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Table 6.11: Case Study VI, The provinces of Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia.
Annual net revenue from agricultural land, USD per km2 .
Crops

Harvest yield Price
Input factors Land use Revenues
2
tonnes/km
USD/tonne USD per km2
USD
179
250
10700
73 %
19140
1050
140
15950
5%
5045
3500
40
4850
22 %
22894
296

Irrigated wheat
Potato
Forage crops
Grazing

Annual net revenue USD per km2 agricultural land
Cropping intensity
Grazing time

47375

0.77
0.23

Table 6.12: Case Study VII, The provinces of Helmand.
Annual net revenue from agricultural land, USD per km2 .
Crops

Harvest yield Price
Input factors Land use Revenues
tonnes/km2
USD/tonne USD per km2
USD
210
245
10700
52 %
35175
140
333
7650
14 %
9057
192
170
7050
17 %
7221
390
34
4850
5%
698
181
249
12592
12 %
6450

Irrigated wheat
Cotton
Maize
Alfalfa
Other

Annual net revenue USD per km2 agricultural land
Cropping intensity

58601

1.66

Table 6.13: Case Study VIII, The province of Herat, Badghis, Farah, Nimroz.
Annual net revenue from agricultural land, USD per km2 .
Crops

Harvest yield Price
Input factors Land use Revenues
tonnes/km2
USD/tonne USD per km2
USD
189
235
10700
40 %
21578
160
145
7050
12 %
3101
155
520
8600
20 %
23040
350
38
4850
12 %
1622
55
833
5250
16 %
10385

Irrigated wheat
Maize
Bean
Clover
Rainfed carabie

Annual net revenue USD per km2 agricultural land
Cropping intensity

59725

1.6

In some areas of Afghanistan poppy and cannabis form integral parts of the cropping
pattern, and play an essential role in the economy. Case Studies IV, V and VII comprise
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districts that are poppy-growing areas, whereas cannabis is grown in Case Study VI
areas.
Incomes from illicit crops are not included in this study. Before clearance the landowner
will have to give a solemn promise not to cultivate any illicit crop on the cleared land and
sign a contract to that effect.
Poppy production gives most farmers a substantially higher revenue than alternative
crops. In the year 2000-season the farm-gate price for fresh opium was about USD 50 per
kg. The annual net revenue from cultivation of one km2 with poppy would then be
between USD 357,000 to USD 425,000. Revenues from other crops in Case Study IV and
VII areas could certainly not compete with that.
A time horizon of 15 years has been selected for the benefits from reclaimed agricultural
land after mine clearance. This is a reasonable length of time taking into account the fact
that uncertainty will increase over time as to prices, crop patterns etc. Discounted at 10%
over the whole period, the benefits gained during the early years will carry a large weight
in the total value, while the benefits collected after 15 years will have relatively little
importance.
Table 6.14:

Agricultural land, net output value in USD 1000 of production from one
km2 annually and discounted over 15 years at 10% discount rate.
Annual Value
USD 1000

Total Value USD 1000
over 15 years
14
103
79
604
193
1 470
135
1 027
520
3 956
47
360
59
446
60
454

Case Study I
Case Study II
Case Study III
Case Study IV
Case Study V
Case Study VI
Case Study VII
Case Study VIII

The net annual value of agricultural production shows wide variations, from USD 14,000
annually in the Northern Region (Case Study I) to over USD 500,000 in the provinces of
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan (Case Study V). The Total Value in table 6.14 comprising
annual values discounted over 15 years, will constitute one of the benefit components to
be compared with the cost of clearing one km2 of agricultural land.
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7.

Irrigation systems blocked by mines

7.1
The role of irrigation in Afghanistan
The origin of irrigated agriculture in Afghanistan dates back more than 4,500 years, and
today irrigation systems in Afghanistan still remain vital for agricultural production.
Between 85% and 90% of all crops are grown under irrigation. The different irrigation
systems comprise sources and techniques like streams, canals, springs, karezes and arhats
(Persian wheels), depending on availability and farm location. Irrigation systems can be
divided into two main categories: traditional and modern systems, each one sub-divided
into 3-5 sub-categories.
Traditional Irrigation Systems:
Arhat: Ground water is lifted from shallow wells with the help of a Persian wheel
(Arhat), supplying irrigation water for the fields of an individual farmer. The size of the
area irrigated by a single arhat does not exceed 0.03 km2 .
Karez (Qanat): This system is used in steep areas. Underground water is brought into
free flow through tunnels from alluvial aquifers. Karezes are dug by local craftsmen as
shafts at close intervals, they are usually narrow but may be many km in length.
Discharge varies between 10 to 500 litres per second. The irrigated land ranges from 1 to
2 km2 . Karez water can also be used for drinking water.
Small-scale water systems are supplied by stream flow diverted with the help of
temporary brush weirs. Often situated in remote valleys along a stream or river, they vary
in size, irrigating up to 1 km2 . The villagers themselves are responsible for arrangements
and maintenance.
Medium-scale surface water systems are supplied by river flow diverted with the help
of brush weirs, and can irrigate the agricultural land of several villages. Size can be from
1 to 20 km2 . They are operated by villagers in a similar way as small-scale and large scale
irrigation systems.
Large-scale surface water systems are supplied by river flow diverted with the help of
temporary brush weirs. Extending over areas up to 2000 km2 , they are located on flat
plains and along the main valleys. Their operation and maintenance are highly structured
and involve several communities, sometimes of different ethnic origins. Each village has
at least one water master (Miraab), delegating his authority to sub water masters
responsible for allocation of water to the different plots of the scheme.
Modern Irrigation Systems include:
– Modern (formal) surface water systems without storage;
– Modern (formal) surface water systems with storage;
– Modern (formal) ground water systems.
Cropping intensity varies widely from system to system according to the scarcity of water
versus land. It reaches 2 in the upper part of the irrigation schemes while in the lower
parts up to 2/3 of the command area is kept fallow each year on rotational basis.
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Table 7.1: Irrigated land in Afghanistan by type of irrigation source
Type of irrigation source

Streams and
canals

Springs

Kareze

Arhat (Persian
wheel)

Number

7822

5558

6741

8595

20180

1870

1670

120

2

Area cultivated in km .

Source: Afghan Agriculture in Figures, 1978

Today more than two thirds of Afghanistan’s irrigation schemes are not operating
satisfactorily. It is estimated that 10% of all irrigation system in Afghanistan were
directly affected by war. In addition come the indirect effects of neglect and
abandonment. One principal reason for irrigation systems falling into disuse is the
blocking by landmines, during the Soviet occupation as well as after the take over of
power by the Islamic Parties in 1992.
7.2
Economic benefits from de -mining irrigation systems
An area of 8 km2 of irrigation systems has been de-mined under the mine action
programme by the year 2000. According to MAPA assessments17 there is a remaining 3.8
km2 of high priority irrigation systems still to be cleared. Another 0.6 km2 of mine
infested irrigation systems have been identified and assigned lower priority.
Table 7.2: Mines in irrigation systems, km2 .
Year
Cleared land km2.
Remaining by 2000
– high priority
– other area

1990-2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
8.0
1.2
0.4
0.7
0.5 0.7
1.3
3.8
0.6

The data used for analysis of mine clearance in agricultural areas in chapter 6 will also be
applied for irrigation systems. The benefits to agriculture from clearance of irrigation
systems, will consist of potentials for improved use of the areas irrigated by the system.
These areas are usually much larger than the actual extent of the irrigation system itself.
There is not necessarily a connection between the size of the mined irrigation system and
the land irrigated, and regional variations in this ratio may at least be expected. From the
MIS Socio-economic Database incidences of both very high (average 25 times), and
smaller ratios are found.
For the purpose of cost-benefit analysis it will be important to trace the difference in
economic output from the land after the irrigation system has been cleared of mines as
compared to a situation without clearance. Parts of the agricultural land may also be
mined, when a district is mined, different types of areas will normally be contaminated.

17

Source: MAPA Annual Workplan for Year 2000.

03.07.01/bg/AFGHAN~1

31

In that case all benefits from increased agricultural production cannot be imputed to the
cleared irrigation system alone, it must be shared with clearance of agricultural land.
In cases where the land served by the irrigation system is not mined, there may also be
potentials for use, even though output from crops will be much lower than with irrigation
water available. Use as grazing areas for animals should at least be possible.
Some water may still pass through the irrigation canals, even though parts of them cannot
be maintained because of mine contamination. The farmers may also have alternative
sources for irrigation water, and diversion canals may have been made etc.
The actual benefits from clearance of an irrigation system may thus not always be the full
production from the agricultural land it is serving. For practical reasons a ratio will be
maintained between the size of the mined irrigation system and the benefit area. For the
above-mentioned reasons this ratio will, however, be set at a lower level than generally
found in the MIS Socio-economic Database. There could still be reasons for looking
further into this matter, through literature studies and fieldwork in Afghanistan.
Table 7.3:

Benefits from de-mining irrigation systems, USD 1000 per km2 cleared
irrigation system, annually and discounted over 15 years.
Annual value
Case Study I
Case Study II
Case Study III
Case Study IV
Case Study V
Case Study VI
Case Study VII
Case Study VIII

34
237
578
404
1558
141
174
177

Total value discounted
over 15 years
262
1801
4399
3069
11853
1071
1324
1348

The estimated total benefits from de-mining irrigation systems are shown in table 7.3.
Basic data for these calculations are the benefits from agricultural production in table
6.14. It is assumed that the irrigated area benefiting from clearance is 3 times larger than
the actual size of the mined irrigation system. The main reason for this low ratio is that in
cases of mined irrigation systems agricultural areas in the same district will also normally
be mined, implying that benefits will have to be shared. In Case Study I the agricultural
benefits have been reduced by 10%, indicating that not all areas in that region are
dependent on irrigation. Benefits from alternative use of the areas for grazing animals
have been deducted (source of data is table 8.6).
The benefits from clearing irrigation areas are substantial, with as much as USD 1.5
million per year in the provinces of Case Study V. Total value discounted over 15 years
is large in most cases, and can justify considerable clearance costs.
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8.

Mine infested grazing areas and damage to livestock

8.1
The livestock sector and its contribution to the Afghan economy
Livestock products contributed 16% to Afghanistan’s GNP before 1978, and constituted
about 14% of the exports, while an additional 9% of the exports came from livestock
related products, mainly carpets and rugs handicrafts. During the war a large part of
livestock was destroyed together with other farm assets. Animals in significant numbers
also moved with refugees out of Afghanistan.
Livestock population started increasing with the return of Afghan farmers from Pakistan
and Iran in the early 1990ies. Currently it is estimated that the number of cattle, horses
and camels have attained pre-war levels, while sheep and goats have increased
considerably. A World Bank study 18 estimates the livestock sector’s contribution to the
gross domestic product in Afghanistan at USD 508 million for 1998-99. An increasing
trend is reported for the sector’s annual growth rates from 1995-96 onwards, varying
between 2 and 4%.
Table 8.1: Livestock rearing in Afghanistan, estimates for 1998-99, numbers in 1000.19
in 1000
3919
24051
9758
389
1081
294

Cattle
Sheep
Goats
Horses
Donkeys
Camels

Table 8.1 is based on Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) figures from 1995-96,
assuming that the number of cattle increased at a rate of 2% annually, and sheep and
goats at 3% in the years following.
Livestock production is mainly based on grazing in Afghanistan, and 84% of the country
can be classified as pastures or rangeland (table 6.1), where the output in many parts of
the country is seriously limited during the winter season. Livestock in the country seem
to make maximum use of the existing rangelands as well as crop by-products.20 In the
mountains and at high elevations indoor feeding is almost always practised for all
categories of livestock during winter. In northern Afghanistan this is the practice for
cattle, while in the southern and eastern parts of the country livestock can be kept
outdoors all year round because of relatively warm climatic conditions.
About 40% of the areas are suitable for grazing during winter. In the higher elevations
and mountains with low temperatures and long snow cover, indoor feeding is practised
during winter for all livestock, and in the uplands and northern Afghanistan for large
ruminants only. During the food scarcity periods supplementary feeding is practised all
18

Source: Role and size of livestock sector in Afghanistan, World Bank 2000.
Source: Role and size of livestock sector in Afghanistan, World Bank 2000.
20
FAO 1997: Afghanistan Agricultural Strategy, Livestock Production.
19
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over the country in the form of concentrates, hay and other by-products. Some animal
food is imported on the initiative of FAO.
Even the smallest and poorest farmer keeps at least one cow. The common pattern all
over the country is to have more than one cow. Dry cows, young stock and males are
usually sent to the hills during the summer. The community manages the cattle during
this period.
Sheep and goats are generally kept together and mainly graze outdoors for the greater
part of the year. Sheep and goat flocks migrate from the lowlands to the highlands during
summer. During winter and under severe weather conditions sheep and goats are
provided shelter and offered supplementary food, hay, straw and tree leaves, but are also
occasionally fed on purchased concentrates. In Afghanistan nomads rear sheep and goats
in large numbers.
The major products from cattle, goats and sheep are food items, such as beef, mutton,
milk and other dairy products like cream, butter, curd, yoghurt, ghee and cheese, but also
draught power, wool, hair, pelts and hides. Production of Karakul pelts is estimated to
have declined by 50% due to the non-existence of dealers, and despite restoration of the
number of Karakul sheep.
Table 8.2: Prices of livestock products (1999)21 and sector output (1995-96).22
Cow milk
Sheep and goat milk
Beef
Mutton
Wool
Hair
Cashmere
Karakul pelts
Skins
Hides

USD/kg Production
unit
0.21
680 1000 tonnes
620
--0.93
43
--1.28
104
--33
--4
--250
tonnes
450
1000
450
--6500
---

Livestock productivity in the country is relatively low. In volume the production of goat
and sheep milk is almost on a level with cattle milk. Mutton constitutes a significant part
of the total meat production in Afghanistan. There is an exportation of cattle, sheep and
goats to Pakistan. All cashmere wool produced in the country is exported, and about 80%
of the karakul pelts fetch good prices at markets in Europe.
Afghanistan can be divided into a number of agro-ecological zones (see chapter 6), each
with its variety of agricultural production and also with distinctive patterns in livestock
rearing, number and types of cattle per household, utilisation of grazing areas etc. The
grazing season and the resulting need for supplementary fodder can vary widely, with the
21
22

Role and size of livestock sector in Afghanistan, World Bank 2000, page 10.
FAO Livestock Office, Islamabad.
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length of cold winter season and of dry periods. The zones form the basis for the 8 case
studies in connection with agriculture and livestock rearing in this report.
8.2
Economic benefits from de -mining grazing areas
An area of 67.8 km2 of grazing areas has been cleared under the mine action programme
by year 2000. According to MAPA assessments23 there remain 136.6 km2 of high priority
grazing areas to be cleared. By the end of 1999 another 344.5 km2 of mine infested
grazing areas are identified, which have been assigned lower priority.
Table 8.3: Mine infested grazing areas, km2 .
year
Cleared grazing areas
Remaining year 2000
– high priority area
– other grazing area

1990-2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
67.8 10.1 10.3 13.2
7.1
9.3
7.3
136.6
344.5

The World Bank has undertaken an attempt to calculate the livestock sector’s
contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP) in Afghanistan.24 The basic data for the
calculation is the number of livestock as presented in this report’s table 8.1.
The sector’s product is composed of the value of its commodity outputs and of animal
draught power. Price information for livestock products was fetched from major markets,
and in order to estimate farm gate prices, current market prices were reduced by 10%.
The value of draught power was estimated on the basis of the number of work animals,
average days of work and their feed and maintenance cost. In the end it was assumed that
the value of draught power and other products constitute 15% of the value of the
livestock main products, meat, milk, skin and hides. The number of work animals used in
crop cultivation and for draught purposes was estimated at 14% of the cattle population.
For the calculations in the present report, the value of draught power has been set at 9/10
and other by-products (bones, blood, fat, dung etc.) at 1/10 of the above mentioned 15%.
The output of hides has been distributed on the basis of number of animals, taking into
account that an individual draught animal, horse, donkey, camel, normally will be kept
much longer than cattle (5:1).
In the World Bank analysis of the livestock sector’s contribution to GDP the value of
input factors has been deducted. Input factors to the livestock sector included green and
dry fodder, concentrates, grazing from pastures and rangelands, medicines and vaccines.
It was assumed that this amounts to 15% of the total value of the livestock products.
The present analysis will have a somewhat different focus, that is an assessment of the
contribution from grazing areas (pastures and rangelands) to the output from the livestock
sector. First it will be assumed that those areas classified as potential grazing areas in the
MAPA database, generally have no alternative productive use than for grazing animals.
23
24

Source: MAPA Annual Workplan for Year 2000.
Role and size of livestock sector in Afghanistan, World Bank 2000.
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Animals can be sent there for grazing or fodder can be collected for feeding animals
indoor during winter or in the dry season.
Fodder can also be collected elsewhere, on agricultural land or bought. The value of all
such kinds of input, not coming from the grazing areas in question, should be deducted,
but not for that period of the year when livestock can make use of grazing areas.
Medicines and vaccines for animals are seldom used to any degree in poor countries.
Some NGOs have distributed livestock medicines for free in Afghanistan. In any case it
is a fact that diseases occur most frequently when animals are fed indoors and are obliged
to live off a low quality or unvarying diet, and not when they can roam freely outdoors
and search a wider selection of plants.
In the present analysis the 15% input cost will therefore not be deducted from the gross
value added of the livestock sector. The grazing areas’ contribution to the output from the
livestock sector will instead vary proportionally with the period of the year animals can
be expected to find fodder on the mountainous or barren areas that are classified as
grazing areas in the MAPA minefield database.
Table 8.4: Net output value per animal per year, USD
USD
51
9
31
31
31

Cattle
Sheep and goats
Horses
Donkeys
Camels

On basis of the above assumptions table 8.4 emerges with estimates for net output value
in USD per animal per year. For cattle the output value consists of the value of cow milk,
cattle meat, part of hides, part of draught power, and part of other products. For sheep and
goats the value of their meat, milk, wool, skin, hair, pelts and part of other products are
aggregated. Horses, donkeys and camels gain their output value from draught power,
hides and a proportional share of other products.
The level of productivity of the Afghan pastures varies significantly between areas and
from one year to another. FAO estimates the average production on the country’s
pastures and rangelands (in total 547,000 km2 ) at 70 tonnes of fodder (as dry matter) per
km2 per year, in addition a 50% degree of utilisation by livestock is assumed.25 Given
that the grazing areas cleared of mines under MAPA all are classified as high priority
areas, it could be reasonable to assume that they must yield at least 50% more than the
average. The degree of utilisation could also be larger than the average, as they are
supposedly located close to settlements. With 80% degree of utilisation we end up with a
yield of 84 tonnes fodder (in dry matter) per km2 of grazing area a year.

25

FAO 1997: Afghanistan Agricultural Strategy, Livestock Production, page 19.
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The number of livestock that can be sustained on this amount of fodder depends on the
composition of the flock and the consumption of each type of animal. On basis of FAO
information a cow consumes annually 2.6 tonnes of fodder (in dry material) a sheep or
goat 0.3 tonnes and horses, whilst we have assumed donkeys and camels as equal to the
average livestock unit of 3.1 tonne.
The Case Studies will comprise 8 typologies for livestock rearing in Afghanistan. All
regions that are of interest in connection with mine clearance are covered. Livestock
rearing practices vary considerably between some of these typologies.
Table 8.5:

Livestock practices, number of cattle per household in different parts of
Afghanistan.

Provinces, regions
I
Northern Region all provinces*
II
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
III
Logar, Wardak,
IV
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
V
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
VI
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
VII
Helmand
VIII Herat, Badghis, Farah, Nimroz
Fodder consumption, tonnes per livestock/year
Case Study

Cattle Sheep and goats Horses, donkeys, camels

7
4
3
3
1
3
4
3
2.6

230
3
3
2
3
3
12
25
0.3

6
1
1
1
0
3
1
1
3.1

* The Northern Region consists of the provinces of Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz, Baghlan,
Takhar, Badakhstan.

The size of the livestock flock that can be sustained on the annual production of one km2
of grazing area is then calculated, taking into account these regional variations. Actually
the flock in Case Study I will have to move to new areas after about 9 months, whilst in
other cases more livestock could be sustained for a whole year on the annual production
from one km2 of grazing areas than the flocks specified in table 8.5. The flocks are then
adjusted so as to consume a year’s production from one km2 exactly, while retaining the
composition on livestock typical for the region covered by each Case Study.
The resulting flock size is finally multiplied by the net output value per animal per year
from table 8.4, so as to find the net annual output value from livestock rearing on one
km2 of grazing area. Regional variations will appear on the basis of the patterns of
livestock rearing introduced in Case Studies I-VIII.
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Table 8.6:

Net annual output value and total, 15 years discounted value from
livestock rearing on one km2 of grazing area USD.
Case Study

I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII

Regions, provinces
Northern Region all provinces*
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
Logar, Wardak
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
Helmand
Heart, Badghis, Farah, Nimroz

Annual
2076
1556
1500
1500
1905
1287
1707
1932

Total 15 years
15791
11834
11411
11411
14487
9788
12986
14692

*The Northern Region consists of the provinces of Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz, Baghlan,
Takhar, Badakhstan

The net output from a flock of livestock, typical for the Northern Region (Case Study I in
table 8.6), consuming exactly the annual production from one km2 of grazing area will
thus amount to USD 2076. This will constitute parts of the benefits when one km2 of
grazing area in the same province is cleared of mines and UXO. Benefits of an equal
amount are assumed to be gained from that particular cleared area in future years too. A
period of 15 years has been considered, and benefits are discounted at 10% annually over
that time, to make up the total benefits.
Net annual output value from livestock rearing on one km2 of grazing area varies roughly
between USD 1200 and USD 2000, that is to say much more modest values than were
encountered in the agricultural sector.
For the Northern Region e.g. the total future discounted benefits from livestock rearing
on one km2 of grazing area will thus amount to over USD 15,000, which, together with
other benefits from clearance of grazing areas can be compared against the prevailing
costs of mine clearance.
A large proportion of the Afghan people lives as refugees abroad or as internally
displaced persons. It is assumed that the areas cleared of mines will to a large degree
provide a means of living for people who otherwise are sustained on aid from the
international community or from work in other countries. It can thus be assumed that the
labour power input to the cattle-rearing sector will have little alternative value.
8.3
Livestock killed by mines
A considerable number of livestock is lost in mine accidents. The Socio-economic Study
(SEIS) found that a total of 242,100 animals were lost in its study areas, which
correspond to the areas cleared of mines by MAPA in the period 1990 to the end of 1998,
166 km2 . SEIS additionally assumed that its study areas had remained active minefields
and uncultivated for an average period of 10 years.
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Table 8.7:

Livestock reported killed by mines during a 10 years period.26
SEIS Total
83,500
155,400
3,200
242,100

Cattle
Sheep, goats
Horses, donkeys, camels
Livestock killed by mines

A large number of mines must have been detonated in accidents killing livestock, even
though more than one animal could have been killed in each explosion. Comparison can
be made with the actual number of mines found during MAPA mine clearance
operations, 210,000 on about 200 km2 of minefields from 1990 until the end of 1999.
From this it could be concluded that about half of the mines are “cleared” by animals
blowing them up. Some exaggeration or double counting is suspected; there is also the
possibility that reports to the SEIS study of killed livestock cover significantly larger
areas than the 166 km2 designed as the SEIS study area. The extent of those areas is
unknown, but could include all mined areas in the districts the SEIS covers. Few other
sources are available for estimates of animals killed in mine accidents.
It can be assumed that few livestock accidents occur within mined residential areas and
irrigation systems. The number of accidents where animals are killed will therefore be
related to mined agricultural areas, grazing areas and roads. It has been assumed that the
mined areas causing accidents where animals are killed are roughly 5 times larger than
the SEIS study areas, also including low priority areas in the district. This gives an
accident rate of 36 killed animals annually per km2 mined area.
Table 8.8: Risk of livestock loss annually per km2 of mined land.
Animals
killed
Agricultural land
Roads
Grazing areas
Value USD per animal

Cattle
36
36
36

Sheep, goats
12
12
12
200

23
23
23
40

Horses, donkeys,
camels
0.5
0.5
0.5
220

The proportion of types of livestock killed on each type of land is assumed to be the same
as for all livestock killed. We have no information about different risks of having
livestock killed per km2 of mined agricultural land, compared with one km2 of roads or
grazing area. Regional variations, for example on the basis of patterns of livestock
holding from the Case Studies, have not been introduced at this stage. The source for

26

Source: MCPA 1999 Socio -Economic Impact Study of Landmines and Mine Action Operations in
Afghanistan, page 17.
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livestock sales prices is the SEIS study.27 It should be possible to retain meat value from
wounded livestock in some cases, 30% of the economic loss is thus subtracted.
When a minefield remains active and uncleared, animals will continue to be killed there
over the years. A period of 15 years is taken into account, and the economic loss
discounted at a rate of 10%. Still, it would be logical that the accident risk is reduced over
the years, as a larger share of the mines are blown up. It is therefore assumed that the
accident risk decreases by 5% annually over the period.
Table 8.9:

Economic loss of livestock per km2 of mined areas, USD annual loss and
total loss discounted over 15 years at 10% discount rate.
Annual Total*
2441 14467
2441 14467
2441 14467

Agricultural land
Roads
Grazing areas

* An annual 5% reduction in accident rate over the 15 years is assumed.

The annual and total economic values from loss of livestock constitute the benefit
components to be compared with the cost of mine clearance.

9.

Roads and transportation systems blocked by mines

9.1
The transportation system in Afghanistan
Roads constitute the backbone of the transportation network in landlocked Afghanistan.
The total length of all roads in the country was estimated at about 17,000 km in 1978, of
which 2,700 km were paved roads. No railways penetrate into the country, although lines
have been built all the way to the border at several locations in Pakistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan.
Table 9.1: Road system in Afghanistan 1978.
km
Paved roads

2,700

Gravel roads

4,300

Tracks and dirt roads

10,000

Total

17,000

27

Source: MCPA 1999 Socio -Economic Impact Study of Landmines and Mine Action Operations in
Afghanistan, page 17.
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The principal agricultural areas and major population centres are linked by roads which
circumvent the Hindu Kush mountains in the centre, connecting Kabul in the east with
Baghlan and Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, Kandahar in the south and Herat in the west.
Distribution of food from surplus to deficit areas has always been an important transport
task. Deterioration of the road network from war activities, general lack of maintenance
and principal roads closed by mines have in periods contributed to rapidly increasing
food prices.
9.2
Economic benefits from clearing roads of mines
In the MAPA databases mine infested road areas have been registered in terms of km2 , to
correspond with other mined areas. It is assumed that road areas infested with mines are
20 m wide on the average. The 27.9 km2 cleared road area will thus correspond to 1395
km of road length.
Table 9.2: Roads blocked by mines.
year
Cleared km2 .
Cleared roads km
Remaining by 2000
– high priority km
– other roads km

1990-2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
27.9
2.1
5.3
4.1
3.2 2.4
2.5
1,395 105 265 205 160 120 125
1,605
391

MAPA estimates28 indicate that a total length of 1605 km of high priority roads remain to
be cleared. Another 391 km of mined roads have been identified and given lower priority.
Some basic data are available from the MAPA socio-economic database on road transport
in Afghanistan. In the survey connected to the SEIS study, data were collected from a
number of 524 cleared high priority minefields, classified as roads. At the time of survey
these roads were all cleared and in use. The data are the best available, but some
deficiencies are apparent. Many entries with value “0” for example are suspected to be
“no reply” rather than the value 0 and can distort calculation of averages.
On the assumption that traffic could make use of other routes or diversions before
clearance, the question of saved kilometres of road, saved travel time and saved travel
cost was raised in the survey. In table 9.3 this information has been used to calculate
some key indicators for road transport:
– Saved road transport distance in km per km of road cleared of mines (Saved
km/km road).
– Vehicle speed in km per hour (Km/hour).
– Passengers transported per vehicle (Pass/vehicle).
– Passenger travel cost in US cents per km road (Travel cost USc/km).
28

Source: MAPA Survey Database.
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Information was also collected on traffic and on vehicles per day on the road. Each
vehicle will here be considered as a small business, where the passenger fares (passenger
travel costs) cover all operational and capital costs.
Table 9.3: Road Transport in Afghanistan*
Province
Case Study IX Kandahar,
Laghman, Kabul
Case Study X Other provinces
Total/average

Roads Roads Saved
no
km
km
141
946
434
383
524

841
1786

1480
1914

Saved km/ Vehicles/ Km/hour Pass/ Travel cost
km road
day
vehicle USc/km
0.5
622
15
2.6
2.9
1.8
1.1

32
191

11
12

8.2
3.3

Source: MAPA Socio-economic Database.

Data for the 524 former minefields can be aggregated on a province basis, and a further
aggregation of provinces into 2 Case Studies has been made on the basis of variations in
traffic volume. Case Study IX comprises three provinces within or around the largest
towns in Afghanistan, the capital Kabul and Kandahar. Road traffic is heavy here, with
over 600 vehicles per day, saved km of road per km cleared is, however, less than the
average. Traffic can move somewhat faster with 15 km per hour due to better roads
presumably. There are comparatively few passengers in each vehicle and travel cost is
less than the average, which indicates a larger share of short distance journeys.
Case Study X, comprising all other provinces shows the opposite characteristics, in
particular with little traffic on the roads, an average of only 32 vehicles per day. Much
road transport distance is saved per km cleared, and each vehicle carries many
passengers. These are characteristics of road transport that distinguish Case Study X as
comprising rural areas from the more urban areas of Case Study IX.
The information in table 9.3 has been collected after the areas have been cleared of
mines. In order to calculate the benefits for road traffic from mine clearance, some more
information is needed about the before situation, in particular of the road traffic in a
situation when a longer and more time-demanding and costly distance had to be travelled.
It will be assumed that road transport demand in Afghanistan is relatively inelastic, with
an elasticity of 0.5. A 10% travel cost decrease will then cause an increase in road traffic
of 5% only. This may be the situation when traffic to a large degree consists of work and
necessity journeys and little tourism and leisure.
The analysed length of road will be 50 km, corresponding to 1 km2 of mined land when
the road is 20 m wide. The purpose is to have all costs calculated per 1 km2 minefield.
It will have to be assumed that the road distance travelled after clearance consists of the
cleared road only, which may be wrong. Other stretches of not previously mined roads
could be included, but we have no information about this. Additionally the information
on saved road lengths in the database may contain inaccuracies. The material actually
consists of many entries with 0 km saved and a smaller number of entries with large
savings.
Employed persons are assumed to earn 1 USD a day, which constitutes the basis for
valuing their travel time. Unemployed and non-active persons may also value prolonged
travel time negatively, here quarter of the cost for an employed person will be adopted as
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3.9
3.7

an estimate. Unemployment is assumed to be 50% of persons in the active age group 2065 years. This age group constitutes 44% of the total population.
By applying these assumptions it is found that travel costs on previously mined roads
have decreased by 30% in the mainly urban areas included in Case Study IX, and by 60%
in the areas of Case Study X. This should have caused an increase in road traffic by 15%
and 30% respectively, with the assumed elasticity of 0.5.
Traffic after clearance is set at 450 and 25 vehicles per day. Some of the counted traffic
may be strictly local and very short distance, for which the cleared road link does not
necessarily play an important part.
Table 9.4: Travel cost per passenger and traffics on links of road, before and after mine
clearance.
Travel cost decrease %
Elasticity
Traffic increase
Traffic before clearance, vehicles per day
Traffic after clearance vehicles per day

Case Study IX
30 %
0.5
15 %
383
450

Case Study X
60 %
0.5
30 %
21
25

The benefits from clearing mined roads are calculated as cost savings for passengers now
travelling with vehicles on the safe road link as compared to the longer alternative route,
which had to be used before clearance. The savings will comprise reduced direct travel
costs or fares paid by passengers, which are assumed to fully cover the vehicle operation
costs. In addition the reduction in passengers travel time has been evaluated, as explained
above.
The passengers and vehicles that used to traffic the longer alternative road link before
clearance will draw full benefits from time and cost savings. Additionally some new
traffic will be generated, as a direct consequence of the drop in travel cost and time on the
reopening of the shorter road link. The benefits for this new traffic can be calculated as
half the amount of savings in travel cost and time.
The basis for this method is that all new travellers in theory could be ranked by their
willingness-to-pay for trips they undertake. It would then be found that some of the new
travellers were barely willing to pay even the new, reduced costs or take on the reduced
travel time, while others would almost be willing to pay the cost and spend the travel
time necessary for the longer journey before clearance. A good estimate of willingness to
pay for all the new travellers together would then presumably be the average, or half way
between the new and the previous costs. Their willingness to pay minus what they
actually have to pay for the journey then constitutes the benefits for these new travellers.
Benefits for new traffic thus amounts to the number of new travellers multiplied by half
the value of time and cost savings.
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Table 9.5:

Benefits from clearance of mined roads, 1000 USD annually and discounted
at 10% rate over 15 years (for 50 km roads=1 km2).

Existing traffic, savings USD/year
- Travel cost
- Travel time valued
New traffic, savings USD/year
- Travel cost
- Travel time valued
Annual benefits all passengers USD 1000
Total benefits over 15 years, USD 1000

Case Study IX

Case Study X

237
29

215
25

21
3

19
2

290
2 207

261
1 983

The benefits from clearance of mined roads are considerable, over USD 250,000 per year
both for urban areas (Case Study IX) and more rural regions (Case Study X). Different
characteristics between the two case studies are blurred out, so that savings appear to be
of much the same order. Less traffic on rural roads is compensated by larger road
transport distance saved per km cleared, and more passengers carried by each vehicle in
Case Study X as compared to more urban areas in Case Study IX.
The annual benefits and the total benefits discounted over 15 years from table 9.5 form
components to be compared with the costs of mine clearance in road areas in the further
analysis.

10.

Mines in Residential Areas

10.1 The housing sector in Afghanistan
It has been estimated that access to 87,500 houses has been blocked by landmines,
constituting one of the major obstacles to the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons to their villages. A rapid assessment in 6 districts of Afghanistan in October 2000
showed that close to 40% of all houses had been destroyed by war activities, and only
some 30% remained undamaged.
A traditional Afghan homestead, the quala is used for residential purposes and for storing
of agricultural products. Parts of it can also be used for keeping animals. The size of a
quala is on average about 500 m2 .
10.2

Economic benefits from clearing residential areas of mines

Table 10.1: Residential areas blocked by mines.
year
Cleared land km2.
Houses cleared
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1990-2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
27.7
3.1
3.4
2.8
2.7
4.9
2.9
55400 6200 6800 5600 5400 98000 5800
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Remaining by 2000
– high priority
– other houses

27400
250

Estimating the average area of an Afghan family homestead (a Quala) at 500 m2 , means
that access to about 55,400 houses has been cleared of mines in the period from 1990 to
2000. According to MAPA assessments29 27400 high priority housing areas still remain
to be cleared. By the year 2000 another 250 mined residences have been identified and
given lower priority.
The houses cleared of mines under MAPA include private homes as well as public
buildings such as schools, health clinics, hospitals, government and administration
offices.
Information on property prices was collected from different locations in Afghanistan on
fieldwork in October 2000. The material is not extensive, but shows some variation in
patterns, which could be expected. Kabul comes out as the most expensive area, with
other eastern provinces somewhat below. Logar, which is a rural area to the south of
Kabul has the lowest property prices.
It was found during the fieldwork that a number of cleared housing areas were only
partially in use or had not been reclaimed at all. The explanation given was often that the
owner could not afford to meet the cost of reconstruction. In some cases the owner still
lived as refugee abroad. These observations indicate a need for more comprehensive
information collection before priority is given to clearance of residential areas, as
clearance techniques applied here tend to be expensive (see chapter 11). More
information on prices and rent of property is also needed. A presumably conservative
estimate of benefits from clearance of residential areas will be applied in the meantime.
This limited material provides the basis for two case studies on property values. Case
Study XI includes provinces with the major towns of Afghanistan, where property values
are assumed to be high, while Case Study XII comprises the remaining provinces of the
country.
Table 10.2: Property land values in Afghanistan, USD per m2 or USD million per km2.
Case Study XI
Case Study XII

Province
Kabul, Kandahar
Provinces except XI

USD/m2
5
2

The information in table 10.2 is assumed to reflect values of land, which has been
declared as high priority residential areas for mine clearance by MAPA.

29

Source: MAPA Survey Database.
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11

Clearance Operations and Costs

11.1 Programme Financing and Cost Information
The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) is financed from two main
sources. The main stream of funding from donors is channelled through the UNOCHA
Afghan Emergency Trust Fund (AETF), which then distributes the funds by activities and
to different NGOs. A smaller, but still considerable part of the funds is passed from
donors directly to individual NGOs. Donors can then avoid paying the fixed 13% charge
designed to finance UNOCHA overhead costs.
As regards some of the NGOs the size of the funds passed on directly is still only
partially known to MAPA. It is, however, possible to single out the clearance tasks
undertaken on UNOCHA/AETF funds. For 1999 this appears to be 85% of the total
mined areas cleared under MAPA and 54% of the former battlefield areas.
Some contribution, both through and outside AETF, is made by donors in kind,
equipment, technical assistance, training etc. The real value to the programme of these
contributions can be difficult to assess. Most of them are purchased in high-cost countries
at elevated prices, while MAPA in an untied situation could probably have found more
economical options.
The information on MAPA funding as it appears in its Annual Reports will thus have to
be corrected in order to estimate the real costs of the programme. For this study
information about other financing has been gathered mainly through information supplied
to MACA by the NGOs. Still it is clear that some elements are lacking for the cost of the
mine clearance programme in Afghanistan.
For the NGOs engaged in mine clearance it can be stated, however, which parts of their
activities are financed through AETF. On that basis a split of activities has been made in
order to correct the estimates of unit costs, like cost per clearance team hour and cost per
km2 cleared.
A number of factors are considered important for the cost of mine clearance. The
following information can be obtained from the MAPA Minefield Database:
– Size of area to be cleared.
– Minefield or former battlefields.
– Types of mined area: agricultural, residential, road, irrigation system, grazing
land (former battlefields are not classified on types of area).
– Surface of soil in area.
– Clearing techniques applied: manual teams, mine dog teams, mechanical
teams (currently backhoe), community based clearance.
– Number of mines and UXO detected (known only after clearance is
completed).
Minefields and former battlefields are cleared by teams using various techniques.
Actually the mechanical option consist of backhoes, but other machines have been
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applied previously and new ones are about to be tried. Each technique implies different
composition of the clearance team in terms of manpower and equipment. One of the
NGOs, AREA is engaged in community based clearance as a pilot project.
Cost data for the year 1999, the latest available, have been applied for this study. The
main source of information is the MAPA Annual Report, which presents information
both on funding through AETF and distribution of funds by agency (NGO) and activity.
Corresponding information is also presented in the Annual Report for 1998, while earlier
annual reports from MAPA contain less detailed information on costs of programme. For
detailed cost information about earlier years, MACA archives and the individual NGOs
will have to be consulted.
Statistics on areas cleared in km2 for types of area are also presented in the Annual
Report, the source of these data being the MAPA Minefields Database. Information on
clearance team hours has been found most useful for the unit cost calculations. The
NGOs register the number of hours spent by each of their teams (manual, mechanical,
dogs) on individual clearance tasks. This information is entered into the MAPA
Minefields Database. For the most recent years the data sets are complete, while not all
NGOs supplied satisfactory data for earlier years.
11.2 Productivity of operations
Information on area in m2 and clearance time in team hours for each individual minefield
and battlefield is available in the MAPA Minefield Database. The area in m2 cleared per
team hour could be a first approach to measure clearance productivity. For the year 2000
the months from January to July are included.
Table 11.1: Clearance productivity in m2 cleared per team hour.
All areas and techniques
Minefield m2 /team hour
Battlefield m2 /team hour
Battle-/minefield ratio

1993-2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
314 267 299 297 337 413
464
6168 6307 4355 6154 6564 5585 20284
20
24
15
21
20
14
44

From table 11.1 it appears that the area of minefields cleared per team hour work has
decreased over time, from 464 m2 in 1994 to 267 m2 in 1999. One explanation for this
could be that the tasks are getting more difficult as the easier tasks were cleared first.
Generally it is much more time-consuming to clear minefields than former battlefields.
On average for the period 1993-2000 about 20 times more battlefields than minefields
were cleared per team hour work.
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Table 11.2: Clearance productivity for different land types, m2 cleared per team hour.
All techniques
Land type:
Agricultural land
Grazing area
Residential areas
Roads
Irrigation system
Average mined area

1993-2000
343
519
123
470
258
314

1999 1998 1997 1996 1995
299
361
93
532
295
267

392
491
71
759
262
299

368
604
67
486
174
297

354
478
146
741
139
337

351
720
285
457
192
413

1994 1993-2000
Average=1
481
1.1
989
1.7
243
0.4
292
1.5
492
0.8
464
1.0

Minefields are classified by land types when the areas are surveyed. Land types describe
possible use of the area after clearance. Distinctive variations appear in clearance
efficiency for various types of areas.
Agricultural land comes close to the average in m2 cleared per team hour for the period
1993-2000 in total (last column in table 11.2). Grazing areas are normally much less
time-consuming to clear, and this has also, for most of the years been the case with roads.
Residential areas are far more time consuming to clear than the average.
Clearance tasks on grazing land and in residential areas have both experienced significant
drops in output per team hour over the last years. Former battlefields are not distributed
by land type.
Manual teams work on all types of land. Dog teams started operations in 1994, and their
teams compositions differ very much from manual teams. The backhoe is used in
particular where layers of rubble, ruins of houses or earth cover the mines, making
manual excavation dangerous and often impossible.
Table 11.3: Productivity for clearance techniques on land types, ratios between m2
cleared per team hour. Average for manual clearance of mined area is here set
equal to 1.
period 1990-2000
Land type:
Agricultural land
Grazing area
Residential areas
Roads
Irrigation system
Average mined area
Battlefield

Manual Dogs Backhoe
1.0
2.0
0.5
0.8
1.0
1.0
27

4.0
4.0
2.7
2.9
3.4
3.5
58

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.1

Flail
1.8
3.8
3.3
0.3
1.4

One important conclusion is that clearing minefields by means of dogs is on the average
3.5 times more efficient than manual teams in terms of m2 cleared per team hour. Dogs
are actually more efficient in all types of areas than both manual and backhoe techniques.
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Still, specialised teams may be needed on the various types of land. Dogs can be used on
open land with free visibility where trees or bush do not hamper operations. The backhoe
is the least efficient method, but is used exclusively when other techniques are dangerous
or impossible. Flail has proved efficient on certain types of areas, but technical
difficulties have been experienced. Use of dogs has in certain areas seasonal restrictions
because of sandstorms. For former battlefields almost only the manual technique is used.
The efficiency of mine clearing operations has changed over time. An average for recent
years including 1998, 1999 and January-July 2000 of m2 cleared per team hour will be
applied for the further cost calculations. The actual techniques comprise manual teams,
dog teams and backhoe. Flail has been little used in recent years.
Table 11.4: Areas cleared in m2 per team hour, average for the period 1998-2000.
Land type:
Agricultural land
Grazing area
Residential areas
Roads
Irrigation system
All mined areas
Battlefield

Manual Dogs Backhoe
156 918
68
330 802
30
60
637
23
129 691
53
204 785
79
169 817
39
6036

In table 11.4 the area cleared in m2 per team hour is listed for all techniques. In practice,
as mentioned above, there are technical and economical restraints on use of the different
techniques. Table 11.5 shows recent practice. Mined areas cleared in the period 19981999 and until end of July 2000 are distributed here in percentage by techniques and
types of land.
Table 11.5: Mined areas cleared in the period 1998-2000, distributed in percentage on
techniques and types of land.
Land type %:
Agricultural land
Grazing area
Residential areas
Roads
Irrigation system
All mined areas

Manual % Dogs % Backhoe %
18.4
27.1
0.27
23.9
7.4
0.08
5.5
3.4
0.24
0.3
10.0
0.00
1.4
1.5
0.20
50
49
1,1

All techniques %
46
31
9
10
3
100

Manual teams (50%) and dogs (49%) are now the main techniques in mine clearance
within MAPA. Clearance of roads is almost exclusively carried out by dogs, and this has
also become the most frequently used technique on agricultural land. Manual clearance is
still the main method for grazing areas, and close to 100% of all former battlefields (not
included in table) are cleared manually.
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The backhoe is applied on a small scale for specific tasks in residential areas, irrigation
systems and on agricultural land. It has only incidentally (1998-2000) been used for
clearing other land types. Backhoe teams will normally be supported by manual teams,
and a clear-cut separation of activities is often not possible.
11.3 Clearance costs
In table 4.1 an estimate of the cost of mine clearance was presented by dividing the
annual cost of MAPA by the area of minefields cleared. For 1999 costs calculated in this
way amounted to USD 0.6 per m2 or USD 600.000 per km2 .
This first approach cost estimate needs, however, to be revised on several points:
– MAPA undertakes other activities in addition to mine clearance.
Monitoring, evaluation, training and minefield survey are preparation for and thus
integral components of mine and UXO clearance. Mine awareness and advocacy for a
ban on the use of landmines are however separate activities and their costs need to be
excluded.
Mine awareness is the most costly of these components. MAPA has dedicated about 7%
of its funds for mine awareness purposes in the budget for the year 2000. Some NGOs are
engaged in both mine clearance and mine awareness, but it is possible to separate
activities in the MAPA funds.
– Clearance activities comprise former battlefields in addition to minefields.
Actually more km2 of former battlefields are cleared each year than minefields. In the
year 1999 about 75 km2 of former battlefields were cleared as against 34 km2 of
minefields. As shown in table 12.4 over 30 times more battlefield area can be cleared per
hour of work than minefields. This observation gives reason to conclude that minefields
are about 30 times more costly to clear than battlefields, when manual methods are used.
And manual methods are now used for almost all battlefield tasks.
– As discussed above in chapter 12.1 the funds supplied directly to NGOs from
donors will have to be added to the AETF financing.
In cases when information about additional financing is lacking, clearance tasks not
financed through AETF will have to be deducted from the MAPA activity list, so that
costs and activities correspond. Still questions may be raised whether contributions in
kind are included fully and correctly.
– Investments.
The UNOCHA logistics and procurement section provides support to the mine action
NGOs, including procurement of capital goods. In cases when non-expendable equipment
is supplied, vehicles, communications equipment etc, costs should not be attributed to the
year of supply only, but treated properly as investments, subject to depreciation over a
number of years dependent on the duration of the item. Depreciation costs for
investments undertaken in earlier years should likewise be included as expenses for 1999.
This has not been possible to correct for at this stage.
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The cost calculations in this study are based on the table “AETF expenditure breakdown
by agency and activity” from the MAPA Annual Report 1999. This table gives
expenditure for each agency. The agencies involved in mine clearance activities were the
following:
– ATC (manual and mechanical teams).
– AREA (manual, community based).
– DAFA (manual and mechanical teams).
– OMAR (manual and mechanical teams).
– MDC (dogs)
– HALO (manual and mechanical teams, survey).
– MCPA (survey, some manual clearance).
– META (training and monitoring).
– DDG (this agency started operation on a small scale in year 2000).
Only a few of these NGOs are, however, competing for the same type of tasks.
AREA is engaged in a pilot community based mine clearance programme. Utilising the
local communities’ human resources and know-how, the program enables ex-resistance
fighters and other villagers to become involved with humanitarian mine clearance
activities.
The community based mine clearance programme is unique in the world. It is low cost
and payment to village de-miners is in the form of food-for-work or a nominal salary.
There are few logistics costs as the de-miners do not work outside their villages and can
return to their homes at night. Technical and safety issues still create problems (no
incidents reported in 1999). The project has been assigned to work in low-priority areas
only, on fields not containing anti-tank or minimum metal mines. The program started in
1997 and is still clearing less than 0.5 km2 of minefields annually (0.38 km2 in 1999).
In 1999 OMAR cleared 3.48 km2 of minefields. This NGO did not receiving funding
from UNOCHA/AETF for mine clearance, only for mine awareness. Information is,
however available on direct funding from other sources, from EC, NOVIB and Germany.
OMAR is using de-miners from the local villages and costs of DSA are thus avoided.
HALO is engaged in surveying as well as mine and battlefield clearance. In 1999 this
agency cleared 3.6 km2 of minefields and 51.6 km2 of former battlefields. HALO is
working in the districts of Kabul, Baghlan and Wardak on designated areas where they do
both survey and clearance operations. HALO is also self-sufficient in terms of training,
META is not involved. HALO does not pay DSA, since recruitment of people is from the
area in which operations are ongoing. HALO (and DDG) apply working procedures
which are to some extent different from MAPA.
For the year 1999 HALO received financing from USA through UNOCHA/AETF for
clearance and survey activities in the Wardak Province. This is the financing included in
the MAPA Annual Report 1999. By means of these funds HALO cleared 1.7 km2 of
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minefields and 17.2 km2 of former battlefields. The amount of funds HALO receives
directly from donors for its other clearance activities is not known.
MDC is working with mine dogs clearance techniques only. No other NGO is working
with dogs, so MDC costs will give a complete picture of mine dog clearance costs in
Afghanistan. MDC is assisting MCPA on survey tasks with mine dog sets (MDC). The
costs of operating these mine dog sets (in 1999 about USD 905.000) have therefore been
deducted from MDC clearance activities and added to MCPA survey activities. MDC has
since the start in 1994 received support from the German government, some of it in kind.
MCPA’s principal activity is the survey of minefields and former battlefields. Some mine
clearance is also undertaken, mainly as part of survey activities. Thus in 1999 0.3 km2 of
minefields and another 0.3 km2 of former battlefields were cleared.
In this study all MCPA activities will be regarded as integral to the mine and battlefield
clearance activities of MAPA. The MCPA survey costs have thus on a per km2 basis been
added to the clearance costs of other agencies. Exception is made for HALO, which is
undertaking its own surveys.
META is in charge of training and surveying the other NGOs. The budget of this
organisation is added to the costs of the clearance and surveying agencies on a per team
hour basis. HALO is also excepted in this respect.
For each of the above listed agencies the UNOCHA funding has been increased by 13%,
corresponding to the fixed UNOCHA overhead rate, to cover administration at MACA
etc. Direct/in kind contribution is assigned to the NGOs on basis of team hours
performed. A tentative correction for depreciation is undertaken by reducing the costs of
non-expendable equipment to 1/8, assuming that this equipment is depreciated over 8
years. For earlier years no correction has been made. This method is unsatisfactory, and
the cost calculations need to be revised in this aspect.
Table 11.6: Clearance Cost in USD per Team Hour, agencies 1999.

Cost per Team Hour

ManualManual/
ManualManualDogs Manualmechanical community mechanical mechanical
mechanical
ATC
AREA
DAFA
OMAR MDC
HALO
180
59
199
205
154
84

Table 11.6 gives the cost of clearance in USD per team hour on the basis of the
assumptions listed above. Team hours will presumably be the best available basis for
distribution of costs, better than per km2 cleared, since performance in the latter is found
to vary much with both type of area, technique and over time. Team hours are assumed to
vary principally with clearance technique employed.
MDC is quite efficient in cost per team hour worked. Additionally mine dog clearance is
more effective in m2 cleared per team hour than all other techniques (see table 11.4). It
can therefore be stated that mine dog teams are strong contenders for all tasks where this
technique is technically feasible.
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It can be observed that ATC, DAFA and OMAR come out with comparatively similar
costs per team hour, from USD 180-200. All those three agencies operate both with
manual and mechanical teams.
At DAFA and OMAR the mechanical teams (backhoe) work an integrated way with
manual teams. Operations can therefore not easily be sub-divided. In ATC manual and
mechanical clearance methods can be separated, since operations are separated by
different teams. Further efforts to distinguish costs of different clearance techniques will
therefore be pursued with this agency.
HALO’s operations seem very cost efficient, and their figures even include the cost of
surveying, which will have to be added for the other agencies (calculated on a per km2
basis). HALO’s costs of USD 84 per team hour are extraordinarily low, taking into
account the fact that they are operating on a similar basis to ATC, DAFA and OMAR. It
is valid to ask to what extent all HALO’s costs, for instance overhead are included for the
clearance tasks undertaken with UNOCHA/AETF funds.
The community based approach seems cost efficient, but it is still rather early to draw
conclusions here, since AREA is operating a pilot project on a very much smaller scale
than the others.
There is a need to separate manual and mechanical clearance costs. This has been
undertaken by considering the costs of one single NGO, ATC, where such a split was
feasible.
It was found that manual methods in general are 1.5 times more expensive than
mechanical methods. Personnel costs are twice as high for manual teams, while capital
and maintenance costs are not very much lower, in spite of the expensive backhoe
machine used by the mechanical team (cost 134,000 USD).
Table 11.7: Manual versus Mechanical Clearance Methods, Cost ratio per Team hour.
Ratio manual/mechanical
2.1
0.8
0.6
1.5

Personnel cost
Capital cost
Maintenance cost
Total Manual/Mechanical

It seems that actual cost of mine clearance by manual and mechanical teams can explain
about 65% of ATC’s cost level, UNOCHA overhead costs and META services form
another 15%. The remaining 20% can be considered agency overhead (see Annex 2 on
detailed calculations of clearance cost).
By assuming that manual clearance is generally 1.5 times more expensive than
mechanical, costs can be distributed by both these clearance techniques.
Mine action also takes its toll in the form of accidents during clearance operations. The
number of de-miners killed and injured in service for MAPA has decreased over the last
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two years compared to the mid-1990s. As the diagram below shows, 4 de-miners were
killed during operations in 1999 and 21 injured.

Accidents during mine clearance, injuries and
deaths
120
100
80
Injuries

60

94

40
20
0

68
21
4

69

82

63

33
2

4

8

Deaths

72

2

7

7

9

16
10

18
2

1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990

Table 11.1: De-mining accidents, persons injured and killed 1990-1999.
De-mining accidents represent a loss to the victims and to society, and its economic value
can be evaluated by applying the same methods as for mine accidents in general,
described in chapter 5 of this report. A de-miner presumably belongs to the age group 1840 years, he experiences no unemployment and in case of accident his medical costs will
be fully covered (with USD 4000). Injured de-miners are distributed on categories of
casualties in the same way as mine accidents.
Table 11.8: Economic loss from de-mining accidents, USD.

Loss with injuries
Loss with fatal casualties
Total loss

Cost per incident
USD
12 552
16 210

Incidents
1999

Loss in USD
per team hour
21
3.6
4
0.9
4.5

With these assumptions the economic loss for an injury is estimated to about USD 12,500
and USD 16,000for a fatal casualty. MAPA accident rates for 1999, 4 deaths and 21
injured de-miners will be applied in the following and the cost of these accidents added to
the de-mining costs.
Risk of accidents for de-miners will be largest with application of the manual clearance
technique. It is consequently assumed that the accident costs will vary with the input of
manual team-hours. For the year 1999 this will constitute an additional cost of USD 4.5
per team hour for manual clearance technique.
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Costs per team hour can now be combined with data on team hours needed to clear
different types of areas from table 11.4.
Table 11.9: Clearance costs in USD per m2 or USD million per km2 on land types.
Land type:
Agricultural land
Grazing area
Residential areas
Roads
Irrigation system
All mined areas
Former battlefields

Manual Dogs
1.3
0.3
0.7
0.3
3.3
0.4
1.6
0.3
1.0
0.3
1.2
0.3
0.03

Mechanical
2.0
4.4
5.7
2.6
1.7
3.4

Community
0.3

Clearance by dogs appears to be the most cost efficient method for all types of areas, and
will be used wherever feasible. Mechanical clearance is the most expensive, and is
generally used only when other techniques are too dangerous, in particular for collapsed
buildings. Manual clearance is still relatively cost efficient on grazing areas, and in
practice the only technique used for former battlefields.
Mine dogs clearance is keeping MAPA costs down. Dog clearance is cost effective and
also efficient in clearance time per km2 . A large share of MAPAs tasks is now cleared by
dogs and without this method quite another level of costs would have been experienced.
Dogs cannot be used in all conditions and for all types of areas. Still the limitation is
currently not with the amount of clearance tasks or types of land suitable for dogs, but
with the number of dogs and the capacity of training within MDC. Questions are asked,
however, to what extent efficiency in mine dogs clearance is stressed too much at the
expense of safety and quality of work.
While this remains a pilot project it is difficult to draw too many conclusions regarding
the community-based approach. Still, costs with this method are remarkably low.
Relatively large cost variations have been found between some of the clearance agencies.
There is thus a need to look further into strengths, limitations and cost structures of the
different techniques and the approach and operational routines of the individual NGOs
involved. AREA’s community based approach would be of special interest, but also
HALO’s achievements should be monitored more closely and compared to the more
standard MAPA set up, represented by ATC, DAFA and OMAR. DDC should be
included once fully operational. HALO’s seemingly low cost approach did not influence
the calculations in table 11.8, since no split between manual and mechanical operations
was possible there.
Out of 13 NGOs involved with the MAPA programme in 1999 only 4, ATC, DAFA,
OMAR, and HALO were undertaking similar types of activities in mine clearance. Of
these OMAR was totally and HALO partially financed directly from donors. In addition
HALO was loosely integrated in the MAPA programme.
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From this it seems that the NGOs may have managed to reserve secluded areas of activity
for themselves. More direct competition between clearance agencies has been mentioned
as a means of increasing cost-efficiency of the mine action programme. In order to
achieve this, the rather restricted access to the MAPA programme will have to be opened
up, with tasks which are now to a large extent assigned on a command basis being put out
on some kind of competitive tender.

12.

Evaluation of Mine Clearance in Cost-Benefit Terms

12.1 Methodology
The Cost-Benefit analysis of mine clearance activities in Afghanistan aims at including
all relevant benefit and cost components to the extent that information access permits
them to be quantified and evaluated in monetary terms. The following components
evaluated in chapters 5-11 of this report will form part of the analysis:
– Reductions in human loss to mine accidents (tables 5.7 and 5.8 in particular).
– Productive output from cleared agricultural land (table 6.14).
– Productive output from areas that have benefited from clearance of irrigation
systems (table 7.3).
– Benefits from cleared grazing areas (table 8.6).
– Less livestock lost in mine accidents (table 8.9).
– Reduced transport cost and travel time from renewed access to de-mined
roads (table 9.5).
– Benefits from mine clearance in residential areas (table 10.2).

–

Regional variations in benefit components have been identified in the Case
Studies I-XII.

– Cost of mine clearance on various types of land and with techniques currently
in use (table 11.9).
A main evaluation criterion to be applied in this study will be the Benefit-Cost Ratio.

Benefit – Cost

Benefit-Cost Ratio:

Cost
Benefits minus costs or net benefits will obviously be relevant as economic criteria.
Dividing by costs as in the Benefit Cost Ratio facilitates comparison of projects, or
clearance tasks of different sizes.
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The higher the Benefit-Cost Ratio the better is the project. A negative rate indicates that
clearance of this the particular task cannot be justified in economic terms alone. In case
he budget restricts activity the least beneficial tasks may have Benefit-Cost Ratios above
0.
Break-even point will be when the Benefit-Cost Ratio is 0. Then benefits will be equal to
costs for the given discount rate, which is generally set at 10% in this study. A clearance
task with a Benefit-Cost Ratio of 0 thus produces just enough benefits to meet its costs at
a discount rate of 10%. Lowering the discount rate would increase the Ratio, by assigning
more importance to future benefits. The discount rate will depend among others on the
general level of interest on credits in a country, net of the inflation rate.
A high discount rate means that few projects will come out with a satisfactory rate of
return. Still it is generally wrong to think that projects in the developing world should be
subject to a low discount rate. Capital is scarce, and competition should be high among a
large number of important purposes.
There is evidence of prevailing high rates of interest in Afghanistan. Farmers have to
accept significantly lower prices for their crops if they wish to receive payment 5-6
months in advance. Farm gate prices during the harvest season may be as much as 4050% higher than what farmers actually get during the planting season. Such deals imply a
considerable rate of interest, even when the prevailing inflation is taken into account.
An alternative evaluation criterion used in this study will be the Internal Rate of Return
(IRR). The IRR constitutes a more intuitive measure of gain, by presenting a percentage
rate of return on costs, much like the rate of interest on bank deposits.

Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
Generally the IRR is defined as the discount rate, which makes the value of discounted
future benefits equal to costs. The IRR can be compared for example to the prevailing
rate of interest net of inflation in a country. In this study a discount rate of 10% has been
chosen as standard, and the minimum or break even IRR should consequently be in the
order of 10%. This will normally correspond to a Benefit-Cost Ratio of 0 in the way this
ratio has been defined above.
The time-horizon for benefits and costs in this study is set at 15 years. After that time
benefits are considered too uncertain to be reckoned with. Benefits are discounted over
that time when relevant, while all clearance costs are assumed disbursed the first year.
Clearance of mined areas is considered indispensable for increasing food production in
Afghanistan and for the repatriation of refugees to the country. MAPA is giving first
priority only to areas that will be reclaimed for use immediately (see chapter 4). It has
therefore been assumed in general that all areas are taken into use and benefits start to
accrue immediately after clearance.
Nonetheless it has been found (see chapter 10) that some residential areas for varying
reasons have only partially or not at all been reclaimed for use a long time after being
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cleared of mines. It is clear that few other factors can cause the Benefit-Cost Ratio or the
IRR to dwindle as much as lacking or not fully realised benefits the first years after costs
have been disbursed. A first item on the agenda for socio-economic assessment of a
particular clearance task should therefore be to ascertain to what extent the area will be
reclaimed for use immediately.
The Case Studies introduced previously will now be developed into cost-benefit analyses
for a number of model clearance tasks considered typical for MAPA. The following
characteristics will be combined:
– Regions in Afghanistan as of Case Studies I-XII.
– Types of land (5)
– Clearance techniques (3)
The Benefit-Cost Ratios will provide the basis for ranking of the individual tasks and can
be calculated from input data on per km2 –basis. The actual size of area to be cleared in
each task will not have to be introduced until there is a need to consider costs and
benefits separately, in connection with evaluation of the whole MAPA programme or
with budget restrictions for example. The Benefit-Cost Ratios will here sometimes be
calculated for hypothetical cases, in the sense that no actual clearance task has been
performed or can be performed for practical reasons, which may be the situation for
certain techniques on some types of land.
12.2
Costs-benefit analysis of Case Studies
The main results for the cost-benefit analysis of clearance tasks on different types of
mined land, with techniques currently in use with MAPA and for groups of provinces in
Afghanistan are shown in table 12.1.
Clearance of irrigation systems gives large returns generally and in particular for the
provinces under Case Studies III, IV and V, which correspond to provinces in the Eastern
and Southeastern parts of Afghanistan. Irrigation systems in those provinces constitute
the clearance tasks that most convincingly can defend use of all kinds of techniques, also
mechanical when that is the only feasible option. The provinces belonging under Case
Study V in particular, but also III and IV give very convincing returns for clearance of
agricultural land when dogs can be used. Clearance of roads yields solid returns, rural
areas in Case Study X not much less than the urban areas in Case Study IX.
Mine dogs clearance is overall the superior technique with the highest Benefit-Cost
Ratios. No other technique gives higher return for any case study; dogs should
consequently be used wherever this technique is applicable.
Mechanical clearance is costly for MAPA. Still there is clearly a scope also in economic
terms for applying this technique when needed for irrigation systems in selected
provinces, for agricultural land in Case Study V-areas mainly, and marginally for roads.
Mechanical technique is currently applied for clearance of residential areas. Justification
for this will have to be demonstrated from case to case, taking into account the value of
the property and in particular the risk that the property may remain unutilised or under-
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utilised after clearance. Scarce data on benefits makes it difficult to draw definite
conclusions at this stage.
Clearance tasks on grazing areas have difficulties with meeting their costs. An economic
loss will regularly be experienced when other techniques than clearance by dogs are
applied. All regions show uniform small returns here.
The Northern Region (Case Study I) provides the weakest justification for clearance tasks
on all types of lands.
Table 12.1: Benefit-Cost Ratios for Case Studies of clearance tasks.
Region

Agriculture
Manual Dogs Mech.
Case Study I
Northern Region all provinces
-0.4
1.7
-0.6
Case Study II
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
-0.1
3.5
-0.4
Case Study III
Logar, Wardak
0.6
6.7
0.1
Case Study IV Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
0.3
5.0
-0.2
Case Study V
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
2.5 15.8
1.3
Case Study VI
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
-0.3
2.6
-0.5
Case Study VII Helmand
-0.2
2.9
-0.5
Case Study VIII Herat, Badghis, Farah, Nimroz
-0.2
2.9
-0.5

Case Study IX
Case Study X
Case Study XI
Case Study XII

Grazing
Manual Dogs Mech.
-0.5
0.1 -0.9
-0.5
0.1 -0.9
-0.5
0.1 -0.9
-0.5
0.1 -0.9
-0.5
0.1 -0.9
-0.5
0.1 -0.9
-0.5
0.1 -0.9
-0.5
0.1 -0.9

Irrigation
Manual Dogs Mech.
0.1 2.8 -0.3
1.7 7.9
0.6
4.2 16.4
2.1
2.9 12.0
1.3
11.5 40.7
6.4
0.9 5.5
0.1
1.2 6.3
0.3
1.2 6.4
0.3

Roads Manual Dogs Mech.
Kandahar, Laghman, Kabul
1.0
8.3
0.2
Other provinces except Case IX
0.9
7.6
0.1
Residential
Kabul, Kandahar
0.8 15.4
0.0
Other provinces except Case XI
-0.1
7.1
-0.5

The individual clearance tasks forming the background for table 12.1 are listed In Annex
3. The relative weights of the different benefit and cost components appear there and all
tasks are sorted on descending Benefit-Cost Ratio. For cases with high Benefit-Cost
Ratio it is regularly the productive output from land that makes the difference. Human
loss appears to be less fluctuating, but clearance tasks on grazing areas can often be
justified on account of avoided human loss alone.
An intention behind the study of selected clearance tasks is that they as much as possible
should provide representative cases, so that conclusions on benefits and costs among
others can be applied to a wider range of similar tasks. The Case Studies conducted in
this report, and the results from table 12.1 in particular should thus be able to provide
estimates of the economic return from other particular clearance tasks at different
locations and for future years.
12.3 Cost-benefit evaluation of the MAPA programme
The data analysis carried out will also permit a cost-benefit evaluation of the whole
MAPA programme. So far calculations have been carried out only for the year 1999.
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Table 12.2: Net benefits of the MAPA mine clearance programme 1999, USD millions.
Manual
Dogs
Mechanical
Total

Agriculture
6.5
17.6
0.0
24.1

Grazing
-2.5
0.1
0.0
-2.5

Irrigation
5.8
1.9
0.0
7.7

Residential Roads Total
2.1
0.0 11.9
3.1
5.6 28.2
-0.1
0.0 -0.1
5.1
5.6 40.0

The net benefits of the MAPA mine clearance programme for 1999 amount to USD 40
million. Benefit-Cost Ratio is a solid 1.5. The largest portion of benefits originates from
clearing of agricultural land with dogs. Clearing of agricultural land and irrigation
systems with manual methods as well as roads with dogs also make significant
contributions.
Manual technique for clearance of grazing areas is more expensive than benefits can
justify. Clearance of residential areas by mechanical technique also contributes
negatively.
Table 12.3: Internal Rate of Return of the MAPA Programme 1999.
Manual
Dogs
Mechanical

Agriculture
Grazing Irrigation Residential
22 %
-1 %
161 %
16 %
101 %
12 %
165 %
124 %
5%
-20 %
15 %
5%
Total MAPA Programme 1999: 34 %

Roads
25 %
125 %
14 %

The internal rate of return (IRR) of the total MAPA mine clearance programme for 1999
is calculated to 34%, which constitutes a substantial return. Clearing of irrigation
systems, roads, residential areas and agricultural land with dogs, as well as irrigation
systems with manual technique show particularly large economic returns. Clearance of
grazing areas constitutes marginal cases, and positive IRR is in general found only when
dogs can be used.
Dog clearance again appears as the superior technique. Manual and in particular
mechanical methods depend on large economic benefits from reclaimed areas, output
from crops and reduced numbers of mine accidents to defend high clearance costs.
Total costs of the MAPA programme for 1999, exclusive of mine-awareness are here
calculated at USD 28 million, revised from the USD 22 million in the Annual Report
1999, which covers the AETF funded part of the programme only. On this basis the
MAPA clearance costs of mined areas for 1999 will be USD 0.77 per m2 . Cost of
battlefield clearance is estimated at USD 0.03 per m2 , with a total cost for the year 1999
of USD 2.6 million.
The reasons for this cost revision are set out in chapter 11. The fact that AETF funding
only covers 85% of the mine clearance and 54% of the battlefield clearance costs,
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accounts for much of this difference in costs (USD 5 million). De-mining accidents costs
have also been added. On the other hand, costs of mine clearance are adjusted
downwards, by removing mine awareness costs from the AETF budget.
Another cause for the high estimates is that the costs applied for manual and mechanical
techniques are based on data from ATC. In general these deviate somewhat from DAFA
and OMAR on the low side but substantially from HALO’s costs on the high side, as can
be seen in table 11.6. In Wardak province at least, HALO is operating with much lower
costs than the ones applied here.
There is a need to look into the cost structure of the different agencies to explain
variations. The cost model used in this Study may subsequently have to be corrected on
the basis of new findings.
12.4 Sensitivity analysis
An alternative assumption where welfare loss is excluded from the calculation of human
loss from mine accidents has been introduced in paragraph 5.5. This assumption entails a
general decrease in benefits from reduced human loss in proportion to the accident risk
stipulated for different types of mined areas. The value of human loss in connection with
de-mining accidents will be reduced likewise.
Table 12.4:

Alternative assumptions: Benefit-Cost Ratios for Case Studies of clearance
tasks.

Region

Agriculture
Manual Dogs Mech.
Case Study I
Northern Region all provinces
-0,7
0,3
-0,8
Case Study II
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
-0,3
2,2
-0,6
Case Study III
Logar, Wardak
0,3
5,3
-0,1
Case Study IV Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
0,0
3,7
-0,4
Case Study V
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
2,2 14,4
1,1
Case Study VI
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
-0,5
1,3
-0,7
Case Study VII Helmand
-0,5
1,6
-0,6
Case Study VIII Herat, Badghis, Farah, Nimroz
-0,5
1,6
-0,6

Case Study IX
Case Study X
Case Study XI
Case Study XII

Grazing
Manual Dogs Mech.
-0,8 -0,5 -1,0
-0,8 -0,5 -1,0
-0,8 -0,5 -1,0
-0,8 -0,5 -1,0
-0,8 -0,5 -1,0
-0,8 -0,5 -1,0
-0,8 -0,5 -1,0
-0,8 -0,5 -1,0

Irrigation
Manual Dogs Mech.
-0,4 1,0 -0,6
1,1 6,1
0,2
3,7 14,6
1,7
2,4 10,2
1,0
10,9 38,9
6,0
0,4 3,7 -0,2
0,7 4,5
0,0
0,7 4,6
0,0

Roads Manual Dogs Mech.
Kandahar, Laghman, Kabul
0,6
6,7
0,0
Other provinces except Case IX
0,5
6,0
-0,1
Residential
Kabul, Kandahar
0,6 13,9
-0,1
Other provinces except Case XI
-0,3
5,6
-0,6

The main conclusions from table 12.1 still appear to be valid. For the majority of the
clearance tasks the alternative assumption has a somewhat marginal impact, and
economic returns remain sound for clearance by dogs on agricultural land, irrigation
systems and roads. Manual clearance is to a somewhat less extent an economical option
for irrigation systems, roads, and for a selection of agricultural case study areas as table
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12.4 shows. The most conspicuous difference is that the clearance of grazing areas now
appears entirely on the negative side for all techniques and in every case study region.
Table 12.5:

Alternative assumptions: Net benefits of MAPA clearance programme
1999, USD millions.

Manual
Dogs
Mechanical
Total

Agriculture
3.9
13.8
0.0
17.7

Grazing
-3.9
-0.4
-0.1
-4.3

Irrigation
5.5
1.6
0.0
7.1

Residential Roads Total
1.1
0.0
6.7
2.5
4.4 21.8
-0.1
0.0 -0.2
3.5
4.4 28.3

The alternative assumption would reduce net benefits from clearance under the MAPA
programme in 1999 to under USD 30 million. The cost benefit ratio would decrease to
1.1. Benefits from clearance of grazing areas will now generally fail to cover costs, while
clearance of other types of areas still contributes positively where dogs or manual
methods are used.
Table 12.6: Alternative assumptions: Internal Rate of Return of the MAPA Programme
1999.
Manual
Dogs
Mechanical

Agriculture
Grazing Irrigation Residential
17 %
-10 %
152 %
13 %
79 %
-1 %
135 %
99 %
1%
-25 %
10 %
3%
Total MAPA Programme 1999: 27 %

Roads
20 %
98 %
10 %

The alternative assumptions in the sensitivity analysis reduce the IRR of the MAPA
programme from 34% to 27%, which is still a convincing return. In general the IRR
declines by a percentage related to the role reduced human loss play among the benefits
from the clearance tasks. Clearance of grazing areas will now show a negative
contribution overall.

13.

Economic evaluation of other mine action programme
activities

13.1 Introduction
In addition to survey and clearance of mined areas the MAPA field of activities
comprises among others (see chapter 4):
– Survey and clearance of former battlefields.
– Mine and UXO awareness and education.
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Data is available on the cost side of these components; The cost of battlefield clearance is
discussed in chapter 9 of this report. Benefits of these components have, however, not so
far been appropriately evaluated, at least not in monetary terms. Further data collection
and analysis will be needed on benefits from battlefield clearance, in particular on the
frequency of UXO accidents, and on the impact of mine awareness campaigns on rates of
accidents of different types.
Survey and marking of minefields and former battlefields are integral parts of clearance;
all areas will normally be surveyed and marked as preparation for clearance. Still it is
possible that surveying and marking, or sealing off mined areas with fences, in some
cases could constitute an alternative to clearance, in combination with targeted mine
awareness campaigns.
13.2 Clearance of former battlefields
In addition to minefield clearance the mine action programme also comprises clearance
of former battlefields. These areas, which were the location of major clashes and actions
at different stages of the war, regularly contain a high number of unexploded ordnance
(UXO) as well as vast amounts of fragments of a large variety of ammunition, weapons
and other equipment.
MAPA started clearance of former battlefields in 1994. By the end of 1999 more
battlefield areas, actually 240 km2 , have been cleared than minefields (about 200 km2).
The main areas for battlefield clearance are the central and eastern parts of the country,
with Kabul on top every year since 1995. Nangarhar (with Jalalabad) had large areas
cleared in 1994, Wardak situated in the same part of the country, comes third.
Additionally there has been activity in the North, in the provinces of Baghlan and
Kunduz as well as in the West on the border with Iran, in Herat and Farah. Activity
seems to be picking up, with 11 provinces included in year 2000.
Table 13.1: Clearance of former battlefields in km2 .
Province
Kabul
Nangarhar
Wardak
Baghlan
Kunduz
Herat
Farah
Helmand
Samangan
Logar
Kandahar
Parwan
Paktika
Nimroz
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Total
188.6
33.5
25.7
7.3
6.1
5.7
4.6
2.7
2.0
1.9
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.4

2000-July 31 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
19.8 51.6 35.9 36.8 33.4 10.9
1.8
2.8
6.2 22.7
8.1 16.4
1.2
2.0
3.4
0.6
1.3
2.1
3.3
0.7
0.6
5.1
2.9
1.8
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.7
1.8
2.0
0.1
0.6
0.4
0.8
0.2
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.4
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Badghis
Faryab
Total

0.2
0.1
280.9

0.2
40.4

75.7

39.1

0.0
0.1
49.2

34.1

19.5

227

Former battlefields have not so far been included under the efforts to assess economic
benefits from the mine action programme. SEIS did not attempt any calculation of
benefits from clearance of these areas, and no socio-economic data are being gathered on
former battlefields in the current surveys for the MIS databases. These areas are not
classified as of type of potential use.
Former battlefields do not contain mines, while UXO and fragments may be found in
large numbers. These will usually not explode unless tampered with or forcibly removed.
Former battlefields are therefore not blocked from all use by UXO to the same extent as
active mines can block an area.
UXO are mainly a threat to people who pick them up to experiment with them or collect
them for sale as scrap metal. It is allegedly assumed that many of the mine victims
reported in Afghanistan are in reality UXO victims, but deficient data makes estimates of
any percentages somewhat difficult.
The cost of clearance is significantly lower on former battlefields than for minefields.
The amount of team-hours it takes to clear a given battlefield area is about 1/30 of what it
takes to clear a minefield of equal size. The estimates presented in chapter 11 indicate a
cost of 3.4 US cents per m2 , or 34,000 USD per km2. Almost all battlefields are currently
cleared by manual technique. The MAPA cost of former battlefield clearance for 1999 is
estimated at USD 2.5 million.
On basis of these costs and the benefit calculations presented in previous chapter, some
estimates can be presented on the minimum amounts of economic benefits sufficient to
justify clearance of a one km2 of former battlefield area. Benefits in excess of this would
make a positive Benefit-Cost Ratio.
Table 13.2: Clearance cost of former battlefields as compared with possible benefit
components.
2

Cost of battlefield clearance per km .
Economic loss at one fatal casualty
Economic loss of an average mine victim
One victim each year over 15 years
10% of benefits for agriculture Case Study VI

1000 USD
34
12
9
69
36

The economic loss associated with a risk of 3 fatal casualties in the immediate future
would correspond to the clearance costs of one km2 former battlefield, the loss of 4
average mine/UXO victims likewise. An accident risk of one victim each year over 15
years constitutes a loss of USD 69,000, which is far beyond the clearance costs of USD
34,000 per km2 .
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Economic loss can also be considerable in cases where UXOs create problems for land
use. Net revenue from one year’s cultivation of a km2 agricultural land for example
exceeds USD 36,000 in all cases studied except Case Study I (table 6.14).
Further analysis will be needed to draw conclusions on benefits here. Allegations have
recently been made, however, that a larger share of the number of victims could be
related to UXO accidents rather than mines. In case this turns out to be the fact, it would
certainly imply a recommendation that larger parts MAPA’s clearance activities be
directed from costly mine clearance to the much less expensive clearance of former
battlefields.
13.3
The role of mine awareness
Mine awareness is an integral and important part of all UN mine action programs,
including MAPA. It can be highly effective in reducing the number of victims, and as
such the risk of accident from active minefields and UXO. Mine awareness is regularly
considered as an integral part of mine clearance. Still, the goal of mine awareness is to
train and inform civilians so that they can live and work with active minefields in the
neighbourhood. Most likely a considerable risk of encountering mine incidents will
remain in Afghanistan long after the identified high priority mine areas have been
cleared.
A conclusion from the SEIS study and other observations is that a remarkably small
percentage of the mine victims report that they have received mine awareness training,
while more than 6 million Afghans have attended mine awareness courses under MAPA,
with 1.5 million in 1999 alone. A large share of this figure, however, consists of people
who have attended courses repeatedly.
It has been assumed that victims could be reluctant to admit having ventured into marked
minefields or tampered with UXO, after having received mine awareness training. Still
there is reason to look into what it would require in the way of extra resources and skills
to make mine awareness initiatives better targeted and more efficient.
A comprehensive analysis will be needed in order to identify the effects of mine
awareness activities in terms of reduced frequency of mine and UXO accidents. Mine
awareness would certainly be assigned a crucial role if surveying, marking and sealing
off mined areas is adopted as a self-contained mine action strategy and an alternative to
clearance.
The mine awareness component constitutes about 7% of the total MAPA programme
costs, or USD 1.8 million of the USD 26.3 million identified as funding requirements for
the year 2000. The cost effectiveness of mine awareness as alternative to clearance will
depend on the amount and the time horizon for necessary future inputs of mine awareness
activities connected to such a strategy.
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14.

Economic Analysis with Local Community Involvement

14.1 The role of cost-benefit analysis in the mine action planning process
It is strongly recommended that MAPA start conducting cost benefit analysis of clearance
activities on a regular basis, and in particular related to the annual presentation of the
programme work-plan to the donor community. Some donor agencies have apparently
already been considering the presentation of more comprehensive socio-economic
analyses a condition for support to the mine action programme.
Socio-economic analysis can henceforth be based on the tools presented in the SIMAA
report where also a considerable amount of data is compiled. There will nevertheless be a
need for continuous information collection, for updating of the study report and databases
and specifically related to fact-finding for evaluation of individual clearance tasks. In
such cases the more generalised assumptions in the SIMAA study report could be
replaced with site-specific data, to a larger extent based on information about local
conditions.
For analysis purposes the Benefit-Cost Ratios from table 12.1 in this report can constitute
a first approach, while data from Annex 3: Cost-Benefit Case Studies, are consulted when
modification of assumptions on an aggregated level is required. In case a more tailored
analysis is needed, details can be extracted from the tables presented in chapters 5-10 on
benefits and chapter 11 on costs. It is also possible to a certain extent, to make
amendments directly in the numerous spreadsheets, which form the background of the
SIMAA study.
Project-related fact-finding fieldwork and literature search should be undertaken to the
extent permitted by budget and time frames for individual clearance tasks or workprogrammes. In such cases the data presented in this report could still be consulted and
constitute a reference-frame for check of consistency and reliability.
14.2 The scope for mobilisation of local communities
The analysis conducted in this study aims at presenting a basis for dealing with the mine
problem in Afghanistan from an integrated socio-economic perspective. Mine action will
take place in a local community context, and it is important to provide opportunities for
the local people to express their wishes and priorities on mine action in the context of
development programmes in general. The local community involvement should be
initiated at an early stage of the planning process.
Local people will be in a position to provide valuable information needed for conducting
mine action operations, and in particular data on socio-economic issues. The aim of the
present study is to provide basic data and methods for analysis. This information can,
however, always be improved by access to more site-specific data and consultations with
the local community should thus form an important part of all fact-finding efforts.
A large degree of local participation rather than a top-down approach will also reduce the
potential of conflicts and contribute to transfer the ownership of the mine action
programme to the local community. Local people should be given the opportunity to
bring their influence to bear by providing information and by arguing their case. For this
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there may be a need to create new institutions or strengthen existing ones. In each case,
participation from otherwise marginalized groups; women, land-less people etc may need
to be secured in particular.
14.3 Priorities on which areas to be cleared
The most straightforward issue on which local participation is needed will be related to
priority making on which areas to clear first and how to distribute scarce resources
efficiently. Other factors than economic return may be of importance in the priority
process, and local preferences may take precedence over a ranking on purely economic
terms. Discussions at open meetings where different interests are represented and have
the opportunity to present arguments will decide on the weight to be attributed to each
factor.
The local community may have viewpoints on various aspects of the programme, also on
technical questions like the clearance technique to be used, in particular since mine action
is a major employer in Afghanistan. People’s opinion for example on community-based
clearance could be an important issue. Resource persons with special qualifications might
be identified locally, so that they can be assigned roles in the programme.
Co-operation with the local community is of course important in all aspects of mine
clearance, for smooth operations, so as to avoid conflicts, thefts of equipment and
damage to installations. A feeling of local ownership of the programme is often a
guarantee for good co-operation, and this attitude can be created and sustained through
active involvement by the local people all the way from the start of the programme.
14.4 Priorities on mine clearance versus assistance for other purposes
As a condition for an efficient planning process, an option should be kept open for the
local community to bring its influence to bear on priority-setting also among the main
sectors of development and support, like health, education, water supply etc. Ideally it
should be possible to divert funds from mine-action to other sectors and vice-versa, when
the local community expresses well-conceived priorities on that account.
In most cases to day this will not be possible, as funds are firmly tied to programmes.
Within the existing context rational behaviour on the part of the local community will
rather be to seek every opportunity of external funding that emerges, and leave the
responsibility for overall planning to outside forces and authorities.

15.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The economic returns to de-mining have been found to be high in general, particularly
since not all benefits could be quantified and included in the calculations. This study has
focused on the individual economic benefits resulting from reduction in mine accidents
and the economic benefits resulting from making the cleared land available for
productive use.
The economic loss related to a fatal casualty from a mine accident in Afghanistan is
conservatively estimated at USD 12,000. The loss from a typical mine victim is estimated

03.07.01/bg/AFGHAN~1

67

at about USD 9,000, when the proportion of different types of casualties have been taken
into account with their respective degree of disability.
Turning to the productive value of cleared land, the net value of agricultural production
appears to exhibit wide variations, from USD 13,500 per km2 land annually in the
Northern Region to over USD 500,000 in the provinces of Kandahar, Zabul and Oruzgan.
The net annual output value from livestock rearing on one km2 of grazing area varies
roughly between USD 1,200 and USD 2,000, that is to say values are much more modest
than those encountered in the agricultural sector.
The benefits from clearance of mined roads are considerable, over USD 250,000 annually
per 50 km (corresponding to 1 km2 mined roads area), both for urban areas and for more
remote rural regions of Afghanistan.
The highest returns as estimated in the case studies are for clearance of irrigation systems
in provinces with good conditions for agriculture. These clearance tasks can most
convincingly defend use of all kinds of techniques. Economic returns also are high for
clearance of agricultural land and roads.
One crucial factor is whether the land being cleared will be brought back to productive
use shortly after being de-mined. If this does not occur, economic returns are lowered,
and would turn negative if there is a significant delay.
On the other hand, clearance tasks on grazing areas have difficulties with meeting their
costs. Techniques other than dogs or community-based methods would be expected to
earn negative economic returns when applied to grazing areas. All regions show uniform
small returns here.
The broader, difficult-to-quantify benefits from mine action would make clearance of
grazing lands more justifiable than is indicated from the case study findings.
Nevertheless, it would be desirable to develop and try out less expensive clearance
methods if MAPA is to include substantial amounts of grazing areas in its programme,
and in particular if areas of lower priority should be considered in the future. Expansion
of the community-based approach could be one option.
Clearance using mine detection dog teams is overall the best technique, with the highest
benefit-cost ratios under all conditions where use of dogs is feasible. No other technique
generates higher returns for any clearance task. Dogs consequently should be used
wherever this technique is applicable. Dog teams on average clear 3.5 times the amount
of mined land cleared by manual teams per team hour.
Currently, dog teams are responsible for clearing about half of the area being de-mined,
but the binding constraint is not the type of land suitable for dog clearance. With more
dogs available, including larger training capacity for dogs, use of this technique could be
further expanded.
Increased reliance on dogs will have implications for employment in de-mining, which is
very significant. However, the resources saved could be reallocated to other high-priority,
employment-generating activities, including expansion of the mine action program.
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Mechanical clearance is costly to MAPA. This technique should be applied only when no
other options are feasible, and the economic justification will have to be demonstrated
from case to case.
The net benefits of the MAPA mine clearance programme for 1999 are estimated at 40
million USD, with a solid Benefit-Cost Ratio of 1.5. The corresponding internal rate of
return is calculated to 34%. These results are robust to sensitivity analysis (for example,
excluding the welfare benefits of reduced mine accidents) and in any case do not include
important non-quantifiable benefits. The largest portion of net economic benefits is
attributable to clearance of agricultural land with dogs. Clearance of agricultural land and
irrigation systems with manual methods as well as roads with dogs also make strong
contributions.
MAPA clearance costs of mined areas are estimated to USD 0.77 per m2 in 1999, while
clearance of former battlefields costs USD 0.03 per m2 . The area of minefields cleared
per team hour work under the MAPA programme has decreased over time. Generally it is
far more time-consuming to clear minefields than former battlefields. Agricultural land
comes close to the average in area cleared per team hour, while grazing areas are
normally much less and residential areas far more time consuming to clear.
It is strongly recommended that MAPA conduct cost-benefit analysis of clearance
activities on a regular basis and in particular related to the annual presentation of the
programme work-plan to the donor community. Such analysis can be based on the
methods developed in the SIMAA report, where a considerable amount of data is
compiled. There will nevertheless be a need for continuous information collection, for
updating of the study report and databases, and specific fact-finding for cost-benefit
evaluation of particular clearance tasks.
The local community should be actively involved in the mine action planning process,
with opportunities to express their wishes and priorities for mine action in the context of
local development programmes in general.
A coordinated initiative to improve mine and UXO victims’ statistics in Afghanistan is
urgently needed. A survey should form part of such an initiative. The regular collection
of statistics on accidents must be better coordinated among the agencies involved. Mine
and UXO victims’ statistics are highly deficient at present. For example, different sources
give figures varying from 150 to 500 casualties a month.
Some observers have suggested that large numbers of victims could be associated with
UXO accidents rather than mines. This might imply that MAPA mine clearance activities
should be shifted at least at the margin from costly mine clearance to the much less
expensive clearance of former battlefields. This issue illustrates the importance of
improving the information base on mine/UXO accidents and victims.
Surveying, marking and fencing off minefields, together with well targeted mine
awareness campaigns, could be developed as an alternative approach to mine clearance,
especially for lower-priority areas where the economic returns to de-mining are doubtful.
Collapsed buildings – where mechanical de-mining would normally be used, manual demining would be dangerous, and dogs unusable – might be a good example.
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Relatively large cost variations have been found between some of the clearance agencies.
There is a need to look further into the strengths, limitations and cost structures of the
different clearance techniques and also the approach and operational routines of the
individual agencies engaged.
More direct competition among clearance agencies could be a means of improving the
cost-efficiency of the mine action programme. In order to achieve this, the rather
restricted access to the MAPA programme will need to be opened up. Tasks now to a
large extent assigned on a command basis could be put out for some kind of competitive
tender, to encourage competition among technically well-qualified bidders.
MAPA is currently financed mainly through UNOCHA, but considerable funds are also
passed from donors directly to individual NGOs. The amount of funds passed on directly
is still only partially known to MAPA. It is recommended that MAPA start collecting this
information on a regular basis.
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Annex 1: Population of Afghanistan (1000) by age groups

Population Afghanistan

75+
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59

Age groups

50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19

41
48
78
88
124
138
176
196

Female
Male

237
258
302
326
375
401
456
490
553
591
666
707
803
838
945
1009
1075
1176
1238
1360

10-14

1448
1583

5-9

1748
1893

0-4
Inhabitants, 1000

Source: Mohammad Ershad: Population of Afghanistan, IIPS, Bombay 1983.
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Annex 2: Clearance costs – Detailed Explanation
Table 1: Cost calculations year 1999.
1999
1
2 Agency
3 Minefield km2
4 Battlefield km2
5 Team hours, 1000
6 - manual clearance
7 - mechanical/dog
USD 1000
8 UNOCHA fund
9 UNOCHA overhead
10 In kind contribution
11 Mine Dog Sets
12 Other fund
13 Total cost USD 1000.
14 - non expendable equipment
15 + depreciation
16 + earlier years depreciation
17 Operations costs USD 1000
18 Cost USD per Team Hour
19 Monitoring, Training
Clearance Cost USD per Team Hour
20 Manual and mechanical teams, dogs.
21 Manual clearance cost USD per Team Hour
22 Mechanical clearance cost USD per Team Hour

Mine and former battlefield clearance
man-mec
man man-mec
ATC
AREA
DAFA
6.63
0.38
2.95
23.81
0,06
32.22
3.48
14.73
28.08
3.48
14.73
4.14
5717.39
741.68
0.12

167.96
21.79
0.00

2581.35
334.86
0.06

6459.19
925.00
115.63

189.76
2.23
0.28

2916.26
74.33
9.29

5649.81
175.35
5.17
man-mec
ATC
180.53
188.18
130.64

187.81
53.97
5.17
manual
AREA
59.14

2851.23
193.57
5.17
man-mec
DAFA
198.74

2

Survey
man-mec
OMAR
3.48

dogs
MDC
16.88

9.84
9.84

19.84
19.84

1965.50
1965.50

1965.50
199.75
5,17
man-mec
OMAR
204.92

man-mec
HALO*
1.65
17.24
17.40
15.48
1.92

3440.28
446.28
0.07
-904.78

1375.60
178.45
0.03

2981.86
33.00
4.13

1554.08
109.18
13.65

2952.98
148.84
5.17
dogs
MDC
154.01

1458.55
83.83
man-mec
HALO*
83.83

man
MCPA
0.28
0.28
1.23
1.23

Total
ex MCPA
31.97
41.11
97.51

13282.58
1723.06

1965.50
16066.64

MCPA
31.99
23.79
983.49

1 447.38
187.76
0.03
904.78
2539.95
40.00
5.00
2504.95

502.57

HALO
5.01
54.15
204.45

Annex 2, Table 1 gives the basic data for clearance cost calculations. Data are for
1999 and information concerns both the mine and former battlefield clearance, and
survey operations for different agencies.
1. Techniques in use comprise manual, mechanical and dogs.
2. Agencies involved, AREA is using community based approach.
3. Data on minefields cleared and
4. Battlefields cleared and surveyed is mainly from MAPA Annual Report 1999, but
corrections have been made for HALO, comprising only MAPA financed
activities in the Wardak province.
5. Information on Team hours is collected from the MAPA Minefield Database.
Team hours are corresponding to the areas cleared.
6. Team hours are distributed on Manual Clearance and
7. Mechanical/Dogs clearance.
8. Information about UNOCHA funds is fetched directly from Annual Report 1999,
page 27 AETF expenditure by agency.
9. UNOCHA overhead is added, 13%.
10. Annual Report 1999 also gives information about In Kind Contribution, this has
been distributed on agencies on basis of work performance in team hours.
11. The cost of Mine Dog Sets working on survey tasks has been deducted MDC and
added to MCPA survey operations.
12. On other funds directly from donors to agencies, there is information only from
OMAR, which is funded entirely outside UNOCHA/AETF for its clearance
operations.
13. Total cost of agencies are here corrected for the above mentioned items. Total cost
for MCPA in this row will be considered as total survey costs. These costs will be
2
divided by the amount of areas surveyed in km and distributed on agencies on
basis of areas cleared.
14. The cost item Non Expendable Equipment in Annual Report 1999, page 27 AETF
expenditure by agency, comprises investments and should be treated like that. It
has therefore been deducted from Total costs.
15. Depreciation on basis of 8% per year is added, comprising capital equipment
procured in 1999 only (Non Expendable Equipment).
16. For Non Expendable Equipment procured in earlier years information is not yet
available (this should be looked into).
17. Costs are corrected once more on basis of 14-16.
18. Costs are calculated per team hour performed by the various agencies. Team
Hours will presumably be the best available basis for distribution of costs, better
2
than per m cleared, since performance here is found to vary much with both type
of area, technique and over time. Team hours are supposed to vary with clearance
technique mainly.
19. META’s costs for monitoring, evaluation and training are added on per team hour
basis.

3

20. Clearance costs per team hour is here listed for the different agencies and
techniques. Cost data on clearance by MDC dogs are complete and are used
2
directly in calculation of costs per km cleared of different types of land in table
11.8 of the report, with survey costs added. Data for AREA’s community based
approach are also considered complete. A split of cost for the agencies applying
manual and mechanical techniques will, however, need another approach, which
will be explained in the following.
21. The results from those calculations are shown as manual clearance cost USD per
Team Hour and
22. Mechanical clearance cost USD per Team Hour. These calculations have been
based on data from ATC only.
The split of costs for manual and mechanical teams is based on data from ATC:
Table 2: Manual Teams
Team Personnel Cost
USD/year
Team hours worked year
Personnel cost USD/hour
Capital costs
Mine detectors (13)
Helmet (15)
Vizor (15)
Truck 4x6 Kamaz (1)
Ambulance 4x4 Land
Cruiser (1)
Pick up Twin Cabin 4x4
Toyota (1)
Apron (12)
Total

155520
1578
99

Cost USD Life time
years
32500
2
3750
2
3750
0,5
31500
5
25000
5

Capital
cost/hour
10
1
5
4
3

Maintenance Maintenance
USD/ hour
10 %
2,1
10 %
0,2
10 %
0,2
10 %
2,0
10 %
1,6

17000

5

2

10 %

1,1

9000
122500

5

1
27

10 %

0,6
7,8

Cost USD/Team hour
Team Personnel Cost
Capital cost
Maintenance cost
Team cost/Manual Team hour

4

USD/Team hour
99
27
8
133

Table 3: Mechanical Teams
Team Personnel Cost
USD/year
Hours worked
Personnel cost USD/hour
Team Equipment Cost
Mine detectors
(4 partic + 2 spare = 6)
Ambulance 4x4 Nissan Patrol (1)
Pick up 4x4 Nissan (1)
VHF Hand Sets (3)
Helmet (6)
Visor (6)
Apron (4)
Backhoe Machine
Total

69540
1508
46

Total cost Life time
USD years
15000
2
24000
18500
1800
1500
1500
3000
134000

5
5
2
2
0,5
5
5

Cost USD/Team hour
Team Personnel Cost
Capital cost
Maintenance cost
Team cost/Mechanical Team hour

Capital Maintena Maintenance
cost/hour
nce USD/hour
5,0
10 %
0,99
3,2
2,5
0,6
0,5
2,0
0,4
17,8
31,9

10 %
10 %
10 %
10 %
10 %
10 %
10 %

1,59
1,23
0,12
0,10
0,10
0,20
8,89
13,22

USD/Team hour
46
32
13
91

The ratio between costs for a manual and a mechanical team hour will on basis of this
be about 1.5. The total costs of ATC as of table 1 in this Annex 2 will be distributed
on this account. Information on ATC team hours, manual and mechanical techniques
is available form MAPA Minefield Database.
Average cost per team hour from table 1, (row 20) USD 180 will on this basis be split
as follows:
Table 4: Manual and Mechanical Teams Costs in USD per Team Hour
Clearance cost
Manual Teams
Mechanical Teams

Total cost
188
125

Accident cost
4.5

Team cost
133
91

Overhead
50
34

Overhead %
38
38

Total costs are here significantly higher than the team costs obtained from ATC. Costs
are distributed so that the overhead percentage will be identical. About 13% of the
overhead consists of the UNOCHA cost; another 2-3% will be META expenses. ATC
overhead could thus be 20-23%. De-mining accidents costs are added to ATC costs on
top of this with USD 4.5 per team hour for manual teams. These are the basic data for
the calculations in table 11.8, where also survey costs are included.
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Annex 3: Cost-Benefit Case Studies
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Case Study
Case Study V
Case Study III
Case Study V
Case Study IV
Case Study V
Case Study IX
Case Study II
Case Study X
Case Study III
Case Study VIII
Case Study V
Case Study VII
Case Study VI
Case Study IV
Case Study III
Case Study II
Case Study VIII
Case Study VII
Case Study IV
Case Study I
Case Study VI
Case Study V
Case Study III
Case Study I
Case Study II
Case Study V
Case Study IV
Case Study VIII
Case Study VII
Case Study IX

Provinces, regions
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
Logar, Wardak
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
Kandahar, Laghman, Kabul
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
Other provinces except Case IX
Logar, Wardak
Herat, Badghis, Farah
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
Helmand; Nimroz
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
Logar, Wardak
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
Herat, Badghis, Farah
Helmand, Nimroz
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
Northern Region all provinces
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
Logar, Wardak
Northern Region all provinces
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
Herat, Badghis, Farah
Helmand; Nimroz
Kandahar, Laghman, Kabul

Land type Human loss Land output Animal loss Clearance cost Technique
Irrigation
914
11853
306Dogs
Irrigation
914
4399
306Dogs
Agriculture
610
3956
14
273Dogs
Irrigation
914
3069
306Dogs
Irrigation
914
11853
1023Manual
Roads
914
2207
14
338Dogs
Irrigation
914
1801
306Dogs
Roads
914
1983
14
338Dogs
Agriculture
610
1470
14
273Dogs
Irrigation
914
1348
306Dogs
Irrigation
914
11853
1736Mechanical
Irrigation
914
1324
306Dogs
Irrigation
914
1071
306Dogs
Agriculture
610
1027
14
273Dogs
Irrigation
914
4399
1023Manual
Agriculture
610
604
14
273Dogs
Agriculture
610
454
14
273Dogs
Agriculture
610
446
14
273Dogs
Irrigation
914
3069
1023Manual
Irrigation
914
262
306Dogs
Agriculture
610
360
14
273Dogs
Agriculture
610
3956
14
1314Manual
Irrigation
914
4399
1736Mechanical
Agriculture
610
103
14
273Dogs
Irrigation
914
1801
1023Manual
Agriculture
610
3956
14
1986Mechanical
Irrigation
914
3069
1736Mechanical
Irrigation
914
1348
1023Manual
Irrigation
914
1324
1023Manual
Roads
914
2207
14
1573Manual
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CB-Ratio
40.7
16.4
15.8
12.0
11.5
8.3
7.9
7.6
6.7
6.4
6.4
6.3
5.5
5.0
4.2
3.5
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.8
2.6
2.5
2.1
1.7
1.7
1.3
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.0

Case Study
Case Study VI
Case Study X
Case Study XI
Case Study III
Case Study II
Case Study I
Case Study VIII
Case Study V
Case Study VIII
Case Study VII
Case Study II
Case Study III
Case Study IV
Case Study VII
Case Study VI
Case Study IV
Case Study IX
Case Study I
Case Study VI
Case Study X
Case Study I
Case Study VIII
Case Study V
Case Study VII
Case Study II
Case Study III
Case Study IV
Case Study VI
Case Study III
Case Study XI

Provinces, regions
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
Other provinces except Case IX
Kabul, Kandahar
Logar, Wardak
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
Northern Region all provinces
Heart, Badghis, Farah
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
Heart, Badghis, Farah
Helmand, Nimroz
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
Logar, Wardak
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
Helmand; Nimroz
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
Kandahar, Laghman, Kabul
Northern Region all provinces
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
Other provinces except Case IX
Northern Region all provinces
Heart, Badghis, Farah
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
Helmand, Nimroz
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
Logar, Wardak
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
Logar, Wardak
Kabul, Kandahar

Land type Human loss Land output Animal loss Clearance cost Technique
Irrigation
914
1071
1023Manual
Roads
914
1983
14
1573Manual
Residential
914
5000
3308Manual
Agriculture
610
1470
14
1314Manual
Irrigation
914
1801
1736Mechanical
Grazing
305
16
14
256Community
Grazing
305
15
14
256Community
Grazing
305
14
14
256Community
Irrigation
914
1348
1736Mechanical
Grazing
305
13
14
256Community
Grazing
305
12
14
256Community
Grazing
305
11
14
256Community
Grazing
305
11
14
256Community
Irrigation
914
1324
1736Mechanical
Grazing
305
10
14
256Community
Agriculture
610
1027
14
1314Manual
Roads
914
2207
14
2552Mechanical
Irrigation
914
262
1023Manual
Irrigation
914
1071
1736Mechanical
Roads
914
1983
14
2552Mechanical
Grazing
305
16
14
302Dogs
Grazing
305
15
14
302Dogs
Grazing
305
14
14
302Dogs
Grazing
305
13
14
302Dogs
Grazing
305
12
14
302Dogs
Grazing
305
11
14
302Dogs
Grazing
305
11
14
302Dogs
Grazing
305
10
14
302Dogs
Agriculture
610
1470
14
1986Mechanical
Residential
914
5000
5726Mechanical
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CB-Ratio
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0

Case Study
Case Study II
Case Study XII
Case Study IV
Case Study VIII
Case Study VII
Case Study VI
Case Study I
Case Study II
Case Study I
Case Study VIII
Case Study VII
Case Study XII
Case Study I
Case Study VIII
Case Study V
Case Study VII
Case Study II
Case Study III
Case Study IV
Case Study VI
Case Study VI
Case Study I

Provinces, regions
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
Other provinces except Case XI
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
Herat, Badghis, Farah
Helmand, Nimroz
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
Northern Region all provinces
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
Northern Region all provinces
Herat, Badghis, Farah
Helmand, Nimroz
Other provinces except Case XI
Northern Region all provinces
Herat, Badghis, Farah
Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan
Helmand, Nimroz
Parwan, Kabul, Kapisa, Bamyan
Logar, Wardak
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia
Northern Region all provinces

Land type Human loss Land output Animal loss Clearance cost Technique
Agriculture
610
604
14
1314Manual
Residential
914
2000
3308Manual
Agriculture
610
1027
14
1986Mechanical
Agriculture
610
454
14
1314Manual
Agriculture
610
446
14
1314Manual
Agriculture
610
360
14
1314Manual
Irrigation
914
262
1736Mechanical
Agriculture
610
604
14
1986Mechanical
Agriculture
610
103
14
1314Manual
Agriculture
610
454
14
1986Mechanical
Agriculture
610
446
14
1986Mechanical
Residential
914
2000
5726Mechanical
Grazing
305
16
14
661Manual
Grazing
305
15
14
661Manual
Grazing
305
14
14
661Manual
Grazing
305
13
14
661Manual
Grazing
305
12
14
661Manual
Grazing
305
11
14
661Manual
Grazing
305
11
14
661Manual
Grazing
305
10
14
661Manual
Agriculture
610
360
14
1986Mechanical
Agriculture
610
103
14
1986Mechanical
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CB-Ratio
-0.1
-0.1
-0.2
-0.2
-0.2
-0.3
-0.3
-0.4
-0.4
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.6
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